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ABSTRACT	
 
Humans are capable of recognizing a myriad of objects in everyday life. To do that, they have 
evolved the ability to detect their commonalities and differences, moving from perceptual details to 
construct more abstract representations that we call concepts, which span entire categories (such 
as the one of people) or refer to very specific and individual entities (such as our parents). 
Organizing our knowledge of the world around concepts, rather than around individual 
experiences, allows us for more rapid access to behavioural relevant information (for instance, how 
to behave when we encounter a dangerous animal), and to quickly generalize this information to 
what we never encountered before. In few words, this is what permeates the world with meaning. 
 
The present work is about the neural bases of learning novel object concepts, a process that in our 
species is vastly supported by symbols and language: for this reason, I talk about semantic 
representations. The word “semantics” generally refers to the study of meaning (and to what a 
“meaning” ultimately is) as it is conveyed by a symbol; in the specific case of cognitive 
neuroscience, it deals with the neural mechanisms that allow symbols to re-present the meanings 
or concepts they refer to in the brain. For instance, we can easily describe what is the meaning of 
the word “DOG”, pretty much as we can explain what “DEMOCRACY” means. However, although 
cognitive neuroscience has focused on the neuro-cognitive bases of semantic representations for 
decades, the neural mechanisms underlying their acquisition remain elusive. How does the human 
brain change when learning novel concepts using symbols? How does a symbol acquire its 
meaning in the brain? Does this learning generate novel neural representations and/or does it 
modify pre-existing ones? What internal representational format (neural code) supports the 
representation of newly learnt concepts in the human brain? 
 
The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, I show how new semantic representations learned 
by categorizing novel objects (defined through a combination of multisensory perceptual features) 
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using words, emerge from the orchestrated plasticity of both perceptual and memory systems. 
Second, I show results converging on the idea that brain regions that evolved in lower-level 
mammals to represent spatial relationships between objects and locations, such as the 
hippocampal formation and medial prefrontal cortex, in humans are recruited to encode 
relationships between words and concepts by means of the same neural codes used to represent 
and navigate the physical environment. Finally, I present preliminary data on the cognitive effects 
of using symbols during learning novel object concepts, showing how language supports the 
construction of generalizable semantic representations. 
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The universe (which others call the Library) is composed of an indefinite and perhaps infinite 
number of hexagonal galleries, with vast airshafts between, surrounded by very low railings. […] 
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perhaps the catalogue of catalogues; now that my eyes can hardly decipher what I write, I am 
preparing to die just a few leagues from the hexagon in which I was born. 
 
 
 
Jorge Luis Borges (1941), The Library of Babel, in The Garden of Forking Paths 
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1 
GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	
 
A key step for making sense of the rich multisensory world surrounding us is to be able to 
parse it into meaningful discrete and recognizable object categories, or “concepts”. To solve this 
task, the human brain needs to extract from experience and combine all the defining details of a 
concept, such as its sensory or contextual properties. This set of information we have about things 
in the world is called “conceptual knowledge”, and it defines the bases for nearly every human 
activity: it allows us, for instance, to remember what distinguishes dogs from wolves, how to use a 
pen to write, or how to behave in a particular situation. A long-standing tradition in cognitive 
neuroscience has referred to the neural representations of concepts in the human brain as 
semantic representations, because of the central and undeniable role that language and symbols 
(such as words or numbers) play in acquiring, organizing, and recalling conceptual knowledge 
(semàntico derives from the late latin semantĭcus, and from the greek term σηµαντικός -
“meaningful”, from the root σηµαίνω «to symbolize, to mean»). The present work is about how 
semantic representations emerge in the human brain, how they are organized, and what are their 
effects on human behaviour. 
 
This thesis is divided into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to the neuroscience of semantic 
representations, and it will revolve around two main themes: the representation and acquisition of 
concepts in the human brain through symbols (an issue known as the “symbol-grounding problem” 
(Harnad 1980)), and the neural codes supporting the organisation of these representations. 
Bringing together knowledge from previous studies, I will formulate two predictions: 1) that novel 
semantic representations, defining the meaning of symbols (words) emerge in the brain as a 
consequence of the orchestrated plasticity of both memory and perceptual systems, and 2) that in 
humans the same neural codes subtending spatial navigation, might also support the 
representation of language-based semantic knowledge, especially in those brain regions mostly 
known for encoding spatial memory and higher level reasoning, such as the hippocampal 
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formation and the medial prefrontal cortex. By the end of Chapter 1 I will present a behavioural 
training paradigm thanks to which human adults learn novel object concepts that I validated and 
used for subsequent experiments. In Chapter 2 and 3 I will present a longitudinal fMRI study I 
designed to test these predictions. In this study, participants were trained  for 9 days to construct  a 
novel semantic space, and crucially they were tested before and after this learning process. I will 
present the two sets of analyses separately, in the format of two independent journal articles, as 
they attack two questions that I believe(d) being distinguishable. Chapter 2 will summarize the 
neuroimaging results addressing the first prediction. Chapter 3 will address the idea that spatial 
neural codes (distance-based and direction-based) employed by specific brain regions to represent 
the structure of the physical space and to support spatial navigation, may also be recruited to 
represent the structure of the novel semantic space during an orthogonal and non-spatial symbolic 
categorization task. In Chapter 4 I will present the results of an independent behavioural 
investigation aimed at verifying the advantages of using symbols to create novel categorical 
representations: although at the moment of writing this experiment is still ongoing, I believe the first 
effects that it shows will be of particular interest for the present dissertation. Finally, in Chapter 5 I 
will conclude this work with a general discussion, stressing open questions and future directions. 
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Semantic	representations	in	the	human	brain	 	
 
 
The nature of concepts has been a central topic in philosophy and cognitive science for 
centuries. A long standing tradition in cognitive neuroscience attacked the question of the neural 
correlates of human conceptual knowledge by taking advantage of the fact that in humans 
conceptual memory is dependent on symbols, such as words or numbers, and can be inferred by 
mostly using linguistic material. Such symbol-dependent form of conceptual knowledge is defined 
“semantic memory” and its study aims at unveiling the neuro-cognitive mechanisms that give rise 
to semantic representations. 
 
Early neuropsychological studies (e.g. Warrington & McCarthy 1983; Warrington and Shallice 
1984) indicated that brain damaged patients have selective deficits for some categories of 
concepts compared to others. More than one hundred cases has been reported so far (for reviews 
see Capitani et al. 2003; Mahon & Caramazza 2010), involving semantic specific impairments for 
living things such as animals (e.g. Caramzza & Shelton 1998; Blundo et al. 2006), fruit/vegetables 
(e.g. Hart et al. 1985; Samson & Pillon 2003), non-living things such as tools (e.g. Laiacona & 
Capitani 2001; Sacchett & Humphreys 1992); and conspecifics (e.g. Ellis et al. 1989; Miceli et al. 
2000).  
Other studies tried to further extend these results by mapping what neocortical regions were 
activated when healthy participants were engaged in various conceptual tasks prompted by words 
presentation. The rationale behind this approach is that words, as abstract symbols provided with 
meanings by experience, guarantee a rapid and efficient access to conceptual representations 
while at the same time controlling the contribution of low-level properties of the physical input. 
When participants are asked to perform tasks that enhance the meaningful nature of words, as 
opposed for instance to pseudowords (e.g. Demonet et al 1992; Binder et al. 2003, 2005; etc etc.), 
only those neocortical regions that store and elaborate purely conceptual information should 
activate: the semantic network.  
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Despite the high variability in the kind of words (e.g. concrete vs. abstract words) or tasks (e.g. 
evaluate if a string of letters was a words or a pseudo-words, or whether two words referred to 
similar concepts or not) used, these studies generated very consistent results. In 2009 Binder et al. 
published a critical review and meta-analysis of 120 functional neuroimaging (fMRI and Positron 
Emission Tomography, or PET) studies focusing on conceptual processing on healthy adults. 
These studies were conducted in laboratories all over the world in a period of time that span more 
than 15 years (from 1992 to 2007), and involved a great variety of conceptual tasks. The results 
revealed a distributed, but mainly left-lateralized network of 7 cortical regions consistently 
activated: the left Angular Gyrus in the inferior parietal cortex; 2) middle and inferior temporal gyri 
extending to the anterior temporal lobe; 3) fusiform and parahippocampal gyri; 4) dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex; 5) ventromedial prefrontal cortex; 6) inferior frontal gyrus; 7) precuneus and 
posterior cingulate cortex (Figure 1.3). All the nodes of this network are associative regions far 
from primary sensory and motor cortices, and they are consistently reported as high-level 
multimodal areas (Mesulam 1985; Sepulcre et al. 2012) with wide and distributed connectivity with 
secondary sensory areas (Achard 2006; Buckner et al. 2009; Andersen et al. 1990).  
 
In 2013, Fairhall & Caramazza directly investigated what brain regions showed the definitional 
property of neural semantic representations of object concepts (that is of concepts that represent 
object classes) – that of showing corresponding, or similar, activation patterns for a concept, 
irrespective to its presentation modality (either the symbol (e.g., the word CAT) or its referent (e.g., 
the picture of a cat) – by using multivariate analysis to identify neocortical regions that represented 
well known object concepts in a modality invariant fashion. They presented participants with stimuli 
belonging to 5 semantic categories – fruits, clothes, tools, mammals, and birds – during a 
typicality-judgment task (e.g. rating the typicality of “hammer” as a tool, or “apple” as a fruit). 
Crucially, participants were presented with these stimuli in either a pictorial (e.g. the picture of an 
apple) or a symbolic (e.g. the string of letters A-P-P-L-E) format. The authors then applied a cross-
modal decoding procedure implemented in a whole-brain searchlight: for each sphere of the 
searchlight, a classifier (SVM) was trained to distinguish semantic content from the multivariate 
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brain activity evoked during the presentation of stimuli in one sensory modality (e.g. pictures), and 
it was tested on the independent brain activity dataset collected during stimuli presentation in the 
other modality (e.g. words). This revealed a network of areas mostly overlapping to the semantic 
network, thus indicating that these regions are indeed representing semantic content irrespective 
of the format (symbolic or pictorial) of presentation. 
 
Among these neuroimaging studies using words to access semantic representations, the most 
consistently reported neocortical region is the left Angular Gyrus (AG), in the inferior portion of the 
parietal lobule (IPL). This region is practically absent in lower primates, and expanded significantly 
in humans compared to their homologues in macaques (von Bonin and Bailey 1947; Hyvarinen 
1982). Given its anatomical location at the conjunction of secondary visual, auditory, spatial, and 
somatosensory associative regions, it has been indicated as the ideal candidate as neo-cortical 
“convergence zone” (for a definition see Damasio 1989 and Meyer & Damasio 2009), where high-
level conjunction of perceptual information is integrated into more abstract, or conceptual, 
representations (Geschwind 1965; Binder & Desai 2011). This view has been confirmed by brain 
stimulation studies, causally linking modulation of AG activity to modulation of behaviour and 
performance in memory tasks (e.g. Sestieri et al. 2013). Yazar et al. (2017) applied continuous 
theta burst stimulation to this area while participants had to retrieve information on audio-visual 
features of recently acquired memories. They showed a significant impairment in participants when 
they had to retrieve conjunctive multisensory information (audio and video together) compared to a 
condition where the stimulation was applied at a vertex control site, and no effect when they had to 
retrieve single modality features (audio or video separately). This indicated a specific role of the 
Angular Gyrus in combining (or binding) multisensory information, an operation that in real life is 
essential for defining new memories and concepts, and also for grounding the meaning of new 
symbols. 
However, other works mostly based on clinical observations, indicated the anterior portion of the 
left temporal lobe (ATL) as the key convergence hub for semantic processing (for reviews see 
Patterson et al. 2007; Lambon-Ralph 2014). Crucial evidence in this sense comes from a dramatic 
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neurodegenerative disorder, semantic Dementia (SD). Mostly affecting temporal regions, this 
disorder is characterized by severe anomia and inability to recover conceptual knowledge even in 
tasks that do not require its explicit verbal communication, such as simple object use (Hodges et al 
2000) or item identification based on sound (Bozeat et al. 2000), taste (Piwnica-Worms et al 2010) 
or smell (Luzzi et al. 2007). SD patients are usually impaired in judging the typicality of items within 
a conceptual category (e.g. guitar as musical instrument), and their performance decreases as a 
function of specificity (e.g. recognizing a very specific dog breed)(Lambon Ralph et al. 2016). 
Neuroimaging studies confirmed that anterior regions of the temporal lobe differently represent 
concepts on the bases of their semantic details, such as categorical membership (Malone et al. 
2016, Borghesani et al. 2016). 
All these studies suggest that processing semantic knowledge in humans elicits activity in a 
widespread network of associative regions that presumably, in light of their specific anatomical 
positions, act as convergence zones (Meyer & Damasio 2009) for inputs coming from lower 
associative and sensory regions. 
 
But how do these semantic representations emerge in the brain? A fundamental problem in 
cognitive science, indeed, is the “symbol-grounding problem” (Harnad 1980), that relates to the 
issue of how a symbol acquires its meaning. In the field of cognitive neuroscience, this translates 
to the question of whether and how the neural representations of symbols and the objects they 
refer to change to reflect the novel, meaningful, association, or whether this novel representation 
emerge separately and independently in brain regions that did not previously represent either the 
symbols or the objects themselves.  
The observation that in some cases there are shared neural representations between a symbol 
and its non-symbolic meaning suggests that symbols acquire their meaning by means of a 
mapping process onto the same neural representation of their referent (Pulvermuller 2013). This 
seems particularly true in the case of numbers, where brain regions responding to quantity, such 
as the Intraparietal Sulcus (hIPS), show a representational code common to both number symbols 
and non-symbolic numerosities, as revealed by fMRI adaptation (Piazza et al. 2007), to the point 
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that even the semantics of complex mathematical sentences activates the same neuronal circuits 
usually involved in processing simpler numerical operations or over digits but also sets of items 
(Amalric & Dehaene 2016). 
 
However, as these studies focused on well known semantic categories, it is not possible to have a 
conclusive answer, neither to unveil what are the brain mechanisms that allow this putative 
mapping or grounding process to happen: indeed, these results are silent on whether the 
computations necessary to attach a symbol to its meaning (and viceversa) happen within the same 
areas the later show the mutual correspondence, or if other areas participates in building the novel 
semantic representation.  
One potentially powerful way to address the problem is to use training studies, where participants 
learn new concepts by associating them with specific names. The use of functional neuroimaging 
techniques then permits to record the activity patterns for the stimuli at different time points, for 
instance before and after learning the semantic association, and thus reveal what are the changes 
occurring in the brain as new meanings are created. 
 
The behavioural consequences of  learning novel with the use of symbols compared to learning it 
without symbolic aids have been indeed explored in behavioural training experiments showing that, 
for instance, the availability of symbols greatly facilitates the acquisition of novel categories both in 
adult (Lupyan et al. 2007) and children (e.g. Althaus & Plunkett 2016, Althaus & Westemann 
2015). There are reasons, coming from behavioural studies, to believe that the changes supporting 
the emergence of semantic information spread also to perceptual representations. Past works, 
indeed, highlighted the effects of categorization on perceptual judgements. Long-lasting expertise 
can improve perception of diagnostic structures and features in animal (Biederman & Shiffrar 
1987) or beer (Peron & Allen 1988) experts, as well as in radiologists (Norman et al. 1992), 
suggesting that learning to recognize specific object categories by attaching them a label can alter 
perceptual processing. Such a categorical effect on perceptual judgements seems to rely on 
dimensional modulation (Folstein et al. 2015) of behaviourally relevant perceptual features. This 
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alteration revolves around acquired distinctiveness between members of different categories 
(Lawrence 1949) and acquired equivalence between members of the same category (for a review 
see Braunitzer et al. 2017). Goldstone (1994), for instance, found that participants who have been 
trained to categorize, using labels, a set of 16 squares basing on their size and brightness were 
more likely to discriminate between across- boundary stimuli compared to a control group, 
providing behavioural evidence for acquired distinctiveness. This “warping” of the perceptual 
representations occurring during categorization might indicate that learning new semantic 
knowledge involves changes that may be traced down to the perceptual systems as well, effects 
that are usually overlooked by studies that focused on well-known classes of object/words. 
 
This might indicate that the symbol-grounding problem is solved by the human brain by means of 
complex and distributed changes that spread even to perceptual representations. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Humans construct their conceptual knowledge of the world by organizing multisensory experiences 
into labelled categories. No study to date systematically looked for the neural changes supporting 
this uniquely human faculty monitoring the early stages of learning to map symbols to their 
meaning. Several questions remain open: does learning generate ex-novo neuronal 
representations that were not present before? Does it also, or only, modify previously existing 
ones? Do these changes involve brain regions beyond the semantic network? What neural 
mechanisms support these changes?  
To answer these questions, I designed a learning experiment where I monitored, using fMRI, the 
neural changes of learning novel multisensory object concepts using symbols. The details of the 
experiment will be presented in Chapter 2, while the remaining part of this introductory chapter will 
revolve around the second central topic of the present work: what is the representational format 
underlying semantic representations? 
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Spatial	codes	for	semantic	spaces		
 
 
 The second part of this introduction is about the format underlying conceptual 
representations in the human brain. This refers to the neural code(s) that different brain regions 
employ to represent the relations between concepts. Specifically, I will discuss a fascinating idea 
that emerged in the late 40s by Tolman (1949) and that has been recently formalized in a 
theoretical work (Bellmund et al. 2018), suggesting that the representation of the knowledge we 
have about things in the world and that we use in our everyday behaviour is supported by the 
same neural mechanisms that we recruit to represent the physical space. This theory states that 
the relationships between concepts and items in memory are conceivable as distances between 
the regions of a conceptual representational space, and thus we can use the same neural codes 
that allow us to navigate in the physical space (spatial codes) to “move” among concepts in 
memory.  
 
Between the 30s and the 40s Tolman conducted a series of behavioural experiments on rats, 
where he observed that animals, to find rewards in complex mazes, were able to take shortcuts or 
find new routes when the old ones were blocked  (e.g. Tolan & Honzik 1930, Tolman et al. 1946). 
He coined the term “cognitive map” to indicate that the animals, in order to show such complex and 
adaptive behaviour, must have had developed an internal representation of the world and the 
relationships between its elements, such as landmarks or locations (Tolman 1948). 
 
A literal interpretation of the word “map” directed the following years of research to find the internal 
neural correlates of such representation of the external physical environment. In 1971 O’Keefe and 
Dostrovsky discovered hippocampal “place cells”, neurons that are active when the animal enters 
very specific positions in the environment, no matter the orientation of the movement trajectory or 
its velocity. The following four decades have seen a proliferation of milestone results in the study of 
spatial coding in this area, mostly represented by the discovery of other spatially tuned neurons, 
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such as head direction cells (Ranck 1984; Taube et al 1990), boundary cells (O’Keefe and Burgess 
1996), boundary vector cells (Lever et al. 2009), speed cells (Kroppf et al. 2015), object vector 
cells (Hoyadal et al. 2017) and most recently even social place cells (Omer et al. 2018; Danjo et al. 
2018). 
The most celebrated kind of spatially tuned neurons are grid cells, first described by the group of 
Edvard and Mary-Britt Moser (hafting et al. 2005), who in 2014 were awarded, together with John 
O’Keefe, the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology. Grid cells were first observed in the medial 
entorhinal cortex of rats (a sub-portion of the hippocampal formation, mostly projecting to the 
hippocampus), and are neurons that fire for multiple spatial locations in the environment. These 
locations correspond to the vertices of a regular triangular grid covering the entire environment, 
and show a precise 6-fold rotational symmetry, resulting in a very specific hexagonal pattern. 
Besides their peculiar firing rate, grid cells show some other very interesting properties. First, 
visual cues strongly influence the alignment of the grid: when external cues are rotated, the grid 
pattern rotates in the same way. Second, grid activity remains unchanged when visual input is 
removed (e.g. by turning off the lights in the environment). Third, grid patterns appear as soon as 
the animal enters a novel environment. Finally, and possibly most importantly, grid cells maintain 
the specific size of the grid pattern and its offset compared to one another even if the animal is 
moved to different environment. This property is not shown for instance by hippocampal place 
cells, that exhibits a profound remapping in different environments (Bostock et al. 1991; Leutgeb et 
al. 2005; Fyhn et al. 2007). In general, grid cells are thought to support path-integration, enabling 
an internal representation of distances between locations, thus guiding mammals’ behaviour when 
navigating the environment (Bush et al 2015). 
 
A seminal study by Doeller et al. (2010) demonstrated that grid activity is present in humans, and 
that it is possible to record it using non-invasive functional MRI. This study moved from a very 
precise observation about electrophysiological data on rats: grid orientation of different grid cells 
relative to the external environment remains constant across cells (while for instance their relative 
phase or size of the grid pattern change). To understand why this observation is so important, 
11 
consider a single grid cell, which activates more often when the animal moves in the environment 
in a direction that is aligned to one of the 6 main axes of the grid, compared to a situation where it 
moves for the same distance but in a direction that is not aligned. If we consider now entorhinal 
activity at the population level, this would result in a stronger signal for movement directions 
aligned to the grid (one of the 6 axes) compared to movement directions that are not aligned to the 
grid.  
 
The brilliant intuition of the authors was that such different population activity should require a 
different consumption of blood, thus it could be observed at cortical level as a modulation of the 
BOLD signal, using functional MRI. Doeller et al. in their experiment asked participants to navigate 
a virtual reality environment with a joystick, while lying in the MR scanner. During navigation, 
participants had to find the locations of some objects, while their brain activity was analysed, 
looking for 6-fold modulations of the BOLD signal as a function of running direction (at this step, 
randomly aligned to a reference direction). The analysis technique they used was particularly 
complex, and consisted in two steps. In a first step, half of the functional data were used to 
estimate the putative grid orientation, by means of a quadrature filter procedure. Next, they aligned 
the running directions of the second, and independent, half of the dataset to the putative grid 
orientation, and looked for intensity of the BOLD signal for aligned vs. misaligned clusters (30°) of 
movement directions. They reported an impressively precise modulation of BOLD signal in the 
right entorhinal cortex, that could not be explained by other periodicities (e.g. 45° or 90°). Crucially, 
when they applied fMRI adaptation to reveal those brain regions that showed a reduction in fMRI 
signal according to how recently participants were running at 60° to the current direction, this 
revealed a network of areas including not only the entorhinal cortex, but also other areas, such as 
the medial prefrontal cortex, best known for its connectivity to the hippocampal formation and for 
its role in both spatial e non spatial memory (Preston & Eichenbaum 2013).  
 
In 2013 Jacobs et al. reported the first evidence of grid cells in humans using intracranial 
recordings, while epileptic patients performed a virtual reality task. Neurons in their entorhinal 
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cortex and in medial prefrontal cortex exhibited grid-like firing patterns as a function of spatial 
position in the virtual environment, thus proving that humans and lower level animals rely on 
corresponding spatial-coding schemes at neuronal level. Interestingly, two independent studies in 
2016 observed grid-like modulation of fMRI BOLD signal when healthy participants were involved 
in imagined navigation tasks. In the first of these studies, Horner et al. (2016) trained participants 
to memorize the positions of 6 objects in a virtual reality environment. Next, they asked them to 
either move or imagine moving to the locations of each object, from various positions, thus eliciting 
different movement trajectories. ROI-based analysis revealed a significant cluster of voxels in EC 
that showed 6-fold modulation of bold signal as a function of running direction. In the second study, 
Bellmund et al. (2016) independently confirmed these results by applying a more parsimonious 
and potentially powerful method based on Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA, Kriegeskorte 
et al. 2008), where they showed that the neural similarity of pairs of imagined movement 
trajectories – carefully sampled to be at 30° or 60° apart one from each other – was higher, in EC, 
when the two trajectories were 60° apart compared to when they were 30° apart, as an underlying 
grid-code would impose. 
 
As both the hippocampal formation and the medial prefrontal cortex are classically associated to 
more general memory functions (see Preston & Eichenbaum 2013, Stalnaker et al. 2015; Behrens 
et al. 2018 for reviews), is it possible that the same spatial codes are involved in non-spatial 
navigation tasks? Constantinescu et al. have made a crucial contribution in this sense in 2016. 
They adapted the same logic and experimental design of Doeller et al. (2010) to ask whether the 
same grid-like activity could be observed, using fMRI, when participants processed a novel 
continuous space of visual shapes. They created 6 bird shapes and they associated each one of 
them to a Christmas symbol. Crucially, bird shapes varied in the length of their legs and neck, thus 
each bird could be intended as a point in a bi-dimensional “bird” space where coordinates were the 
length of the two diagnostic features. They made participants familiarize with this bird space by 
means of a task where they could adjust the ratio between neck-length and legs-length, thus 
mimicking a movement in this artificial space. By adjusting these two visual features, participants 
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had to find the 6 birds shapes associated to the Christmas symbols. Next, during the fMRI 
sessions, participants were presented with brief videos of morphing birds, showing a slow change 
in their silhouette in terms of neck- and legs-length. Participants were instructed to imagine the 
morphing animation to continue “in the same way” (that is, crucially, in the same direction in the 
corresponding 2D bird space) and to guess what kind of resulting bird shape they will find, as 
indicated by one of the Christmas symbols. Although participants were not consciously aware of 
the 2D spatial representation underlying this task, when authors analysed their brain activity as a 
function of “morphing” direction looking for the 6-fold periodic modulation typical of grid-cells 
activity, they found it in a network of areas strikingly similar to the one reported by Doeller et al. 
(2010) for spatial navigation. In particular, this signal was stronger in the entorhinal cortex and in 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
 
This result was the first, and to date the only one, evidence of hexadirectional modulation for a 
non-spatial task in humans, which required memorizing a continuous and bi-dimensional visual 
space. This proves that the grid-code might serve, in the human brain, a more general function 
than representing the physical space, and it opens the possibility of representing conceptual 
knowledge using spatial codes. 
 
But what does it mean to represent knowledge using spatial codes? In the theoretical framework 
formalized by Gardenfors (2000), knowledge can be conceived as organized into “cognitive 
spaces”, internal representations of objects or events spanning by a set of quality dimensions 
(sensory or abstract features). For instance, a zebra and a wasp can be thought as occupying 
different regions in a bi-dimensional “animal space” spanning animals’ size and ferocity, or any 
other two dimensions might be relevant for the task to solve or for the memory to encode. Any 
given stimulus can be thus located in a cognitive space according to a set of diagnostic feature 
values. Relations between concepts (regions of the cognitive space) can be expressed using 
geometrical notions: dissimilarity between concepts can be expressed as Euclidean distance 
between regions in the n-dimensional feature space, and sequences of concepts are thus 
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conceivable as movements in the corresponding underlying space. Interestingly, a very similar 
intuition is also emerging in completely different fields, that of neurolinguistics and computational 
linguistics, where scholars tend to conceptualize word meanings (that is, semantic representations 
of concepts), as regions or points in an internal space, the semantic space, with proximities 
reflecting similarity in meaning, thus highlighting that high-level symbolic thinking might share 
some important features with spatial processing (Borghesani & Piazza 2017).  Under this 
framework, it is essential to provide an interface to index the location of a concept along one or 
more dimensions. Place- and grid- cells do that for physical spaces, easily conceivable as bi-
dimensional navigable surfaces, but they might serve the same purpose for any conceptual 
representation that can be reduced to an n-dimensional space of task relevant features. 
Consider the study by Aronov et al. (2017). In the task they designed, rats were required to use a 
joystick to manipulate a sound along a 1-dimensional continuous frequency axis, to find the correct 
frequency that would lead to a reward. They recorded neural activity in the hippocampus and in the 
entorhinal cortex, and they found that both regions contained neurons that responded to very 
specific sound frequencies. In particular, neurons in the hippocampus fired selectively for only one 
frequency each, while neurons in the entorhinal cortex exhibited multiple firing fields at different 
(usually 2-3) sound frequencies. Crucially, to test whether these neurons were also involved in 
spatial representations, they recorded their activity while rats navigated a spatial environment 
looking for pellets of food. They found that between 25% and 35% of spatially tuned cells were 
also involved in the sound modulation task. These results indicate that during a non-spatial task, 
the hippocampal-entorhinal system of lower-level mammals holds a representation of the task 
relevant features (in this case just one, sound) in a 1-dimensional feature space, where different 
regions or states (the frequencies) are represented by the same neurons that represents locations 
in the physical environment, showing similar firing properties (e.g. single selective vs. multiple firing 
fields for place and grid cells, respectively). As spatial and non-spatial task representations are 
produced by the same neuronal population, the underlying neural code(s) – usually referred to as 
spatial code(s) in light of their first observation in spatial tasks - might serve a more general 
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function, such as representing the underlying structure of an internal representation of the task: 
exactly what Tolman called “cognitive map” and what Gardenfors called “cognitive space”. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Humans and lower level mammals rely on the same neural mechanisms to navigate the physical 
space, recruiting a variety of spatial codes mostly encoded in the hippocampal formation. 
However, the same spatial-codes that allow to navigate the physical space have been observed in 
humans in non-spatial tasks, such as evaluating visual shapes corresponding to regions of a 
perceptual bi-dimensional visual space. This suggests that in humans, the same structures and 
neural codes that subtend spatial representations might also be recruited for more abstract and 
higher-level forms of cognition. To date, no study has investigated more thoroughly this intuition. 
Do “spatial” codes activate to represent human semantic knowledge, which is multisensory, 
categorical, and highly dependent, by definition, on symbols and language?  
I will address this point specifically in Chapter 3, where I will use multivariate analysis to explore 
the existence of both a distance and a direction-based code of a novel semantic space during a 
symbolic categorization task. 
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Introduction	to	the	experimental	work	
 
In the next chapters I will describe three works trying to attack 3 fundamental questions in 
the study of semantic representations: 
1. how do semantic representations emerge in the human brain? 
2. does the human brain recruit spatial codes for representing semantic information even 
when it has no spatial content? 
3. does learning categories of objects using symbols facilitate generalization to novel 
exemplars? 
 
The first two works will describe a set of longitudinal fMRI analyses combined with a 9-days long 
symbolic categorical training, that represented the core of my work during this doctoral program. 
The third work, which is still ongoing, will present the very preliminary, yet of potential interest, 
results of a behavioural investigation. 
 
The first part of my doctorate has been dedicated, besides the study of the relevant literature and 
of the neuroimaging methods that I will be describing later on, to validate a behavioural training 
paradigm suitable for later experiments. This revolved around i) the creation of a novel semantic 
space composed by multisensory objects, which are divided into 4 orthogonal categories by means 
of abstract labels (novel words), and ii) the validation of the behavioural training. I will briefly sum 
up the methods and the results of this validation as final part of this introductory chapter, before 
moving to the presentation and the discussion of the experimental work. 
 
Participants. The study included 15 right-handed adult volunteers (10 females and 5 males; mean 
age = 21.6, std = 2.02). All participants gave written informed consent and were reimbursed for 
their time.  
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Stimulus space. I developed a set of 16 novel animated multisensory objects, orthogonally 
manipulating the size of an abstract shape (Figure 1.1A) and the pitch of an associated sound. A 
total of four size- and pitch- levels were used for each participant, leading to a stimulus space 
where each object represented the unique combination of one size and one pitch level (Figure 
1.1B). The values of these two features were selected for each participant on the first day of the 
experiment, following a brief psychophysical validation consisting of a QUEST adaptive staircase 
method (Watson & Pelli 1987). Using a two-stimuli comparison task for each sensory modality, I 
calculated subject-specific sensitivity as the minimum appreciable increment (Just Noticeable 
Difference, JND) from a reference value (size: visual angle of 5.73°, pitch: frequency of 800 Hz) 
leading to 80% of correct responses. For each sensory modality, four subject-specific feature 
levels were calculated, applying the logarithmic Weber-Fechner’s law and selecting values at every 
three JNDs, in order to ensure that feature levels were equally distant and clearly identifiable. 
Moreover, in order to strengthen the multisensory binding between the two unisensory features, I 
applied a ‘squeezing’ animation during each object presentation by displaying 13 frames of the 
same object with increasing (frames 1 to 7) and decreasing (frames 8 to 13) size along the 
horizontal axis (for an exemplar video of the animated stimuli, visit 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nyq2BgY-8jc&feature=youtu.be). Objects presentation lasted a 
total of 750 ms and sounds were presented at the apex of the squeezing period. The object space 
was divided into four categories based on the combination of two sensory boundaries (Figure 
1.1B). The categorical membership of each object, as well as their unique multisensory identities, 
could thus be recovered only when considering both sensory features. I assigned to each category 
an abstract name (Figure 1.1C): KER (small size and low pitch); MOS (big size and low pitch); 
DUN (small size and high pitch); GAL (big size and high pitch).  
Stimuli presentation. Stimuli were presented foveally using MATLAB Psychtoolbox in all 
experimental phases, at a distance of ~ 130 cm. Multisensory objects subtended a different visual 
angle for each size level, and a different frequency for each pitch level, ranging from an average of 
5.73° and 800 Hz for level 1 (size and pitch, respectively) to an average of 8.97° and 973.43 Hz for 
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level 4. Each word subtended a visual angle of 3.58° horizontally and 2.15° vertically, and was 
presented with black Helvetica font on a grey background. 
 
Stimuli presentation. Stimuli were presented foveally using MATLAB Psychtoolbox in all 
experimental phases, at a distance of ~ 130 cm. Multisensory objects subtended a different visual 
angle for each size level, and a different frequency for each pitch level, ranging from an average of 
5.73° and 800 Hz for level 1 (size and pitch, respectively) to an average of 8.97° and 973.43 Hz for 
level 4. Each word subtended a visual angle of 3.58° horizontally and 2.15° vertically, and was 
presented with black Helvetica font on a grey background. 
 
Behavioral training. Participants underwent 9 daily sessions of behavioral training, aimed at 
making them learn the correct name of each object. Each behavioral session was approximately 
10 minutes long, and it was divided into 4 mini-blocks of 20 trials each, for a total of 80 trials. It 
started with a brief presentation of the objects as exemplars of the four categories (KER, MOS, 
DUN, GAL). After this familiarization phase, each trial consisted of an object presentation (750 
ms), followed by a fixation cross (500 ms), and by the presentation of the 4 possible names in 
random order, from left to right (Figure 1.1D). Each object was presented 10 times per training 
session. Participants were instructed to press one key on the keyboard to select the correct name. 
They were asked to respond as fast as possible, but no time limits were imposed. After their 
response, an immediate feedback appeared on the screen for 1000 ms, indicating with the words 
“Correct!” or “Wrong!” the accuracy of the choice. In the case of a wrong answer, the feedback also 
showed the correct object name, in order to speed up the learning process. After each miniblock, 
participants would be provided with the cumulative percentage accuracy. Starting from the seventh 
training session, the trial-by-trial feedback was removed and participants could rely only on the 
block-by-block cumulative feedback. For the first 8 days of training, participants were presented 
with the same 8 objects used in the two fMRI sessions. On the last training day, without being 
notified of the change, they were presented with all 16 objects. This allowed me to test for 
generalization of the categorical rule to new exemplars (here represented by objects 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 
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10 - 12 - 13 - 15), which would be a key ingredient of an efficient semantic representation. For this 
last session, the mini-blocks number was kept at 4, but the number of trials was doubled, resulting 
in a total testing time of ~ 20 min. 
 
Behavioral training results.The learning trajectory indicated an increment in performance from 
session 1 to 8 (session 1: 46.5 ± 16%; session 2: 66.33 ± 20%; session 3: 75 ± 18%; session 4: 
77.5 ± 15%; session 5: 78.6 ± 19%; session 6: 78.7 ± 18%; session 7: 79 ± 14%; session 8: 78 ± 
19%; difference from session 8 to session 1: t14 = 7.25, p = 4.17x10-6). Performance collected on 
session 9 confirmed both the successful learning of the name-objects association and its 
generalization (training set: mean accuracy = 79.5%, std = 17%, different from chance t = 16.71, p 
< .001; generalization set: mean accuracy = 75.58%, std = 15.29%, difference from chance, t = 
12.81, p < .001)(Figure 1.1E). 
 
Conclusions 
The results of this first behavioural validation indicates that participants correctly learned to 
categories the novel multisensory space using words. Moreover, by analysing the performance on 
the last training day (test day), I can conclude that the categorical meaning of the novel word was 
acquired in an abstract and generalisable way, because participants could correctly categorise 
novel exemplars, a key ingredient when creating behaviourally relevant semantic representations.  
This behavioural paradigm will be largely used in the following experimental works. 
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Figure 1.1 - Validation of the behavioural training. A. Example of audiovisual object. B-C. 16 
multisensory objects are created as unique audiovisual combinations, and they are divided into 
four categories by means of abstract names. D. Participants perform for 9 days a delayed-match-
to-category-name task to learning the correct object-name association. E. Learning curve shows 
improvements; performance on session 9 demonstrates a generalization of the categorical rule. 
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NEURAL	MECHANISMS	UNDERLYING	THE	
EMERGENCE	OF	SEMANTIC	
REPRESENTATIONS	
Introduction	
 
A fundamental problem in cognitive science is the “symbol-grounding problem” (Harnad 
1980), related to the question of how symbols acquire their meanings. Indeed, a key step for 
making sense of the rich multisensory world surrounding us is to be able to parse it into meaningful 
discrete categories, and humans use symbols (such as words or numbers) to construct, recall, and 
generalise this knowledge. Although even very young children can solve this fundamental act with 
a striking ease, its neural correlates are still elusive and largely unexplored. 
 
Previous studies investigated how the human brain represents meanings, mostly focusing on the 
brain responses of adults processing overly known semantic categories, such as that of 
manipulable objects, food items, animals, or numbers. They report that several regions of the 
cortex, mostly in the parietal and infero-temporal lobes (see Binder et al. 2009; 2011) contain 
sufficient information for discriminating concepts both within and across classes, and do so both 
when they are presented as visual shapes (e.g. Connolly et al. 2012, Clarke & Tyler 2014, Cichy et 
al. 2014) and as written (e.g. Borghesani et al. 2016; Liuzzi et al. 2019) or spoken (Liuzzi et al. 
2015; 2017) words. Crucially, few studies suggested that symbols acquire meaning by linking their 
neural representations to the ones of the (class of) objects they refer to: this has been suggested 
to be the case in the case of numbers (Piazza et al. 2007; Eger et al. 2009), color (e.g. Simmons et 
al. 2007), objects/tools (Chao et al. 1999), and places (Kumar et al. 2017). However, since humans 
start learning the meaning of words and thus constructing these kinds of representation extremely 
early in life, it has not been possible to date to witness the neural changes underlying their 
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emergence. As a consequence, how the human brain solves the symbol-grounding problem 
remains unknown. 
 
While functional imaging in young children is possible, it is extremely time consuming and difficult 
to perform. A potentially easier and more powerful way to attack this issue is to engage adult 
participants in training studies, where they have to learn new concepts by giving names to 
previously unseen classes of objects or events. Monitoring, through functional neuroimaging, the 
changes occurring in the neural representations evoked by the stimuli (the symbols and their 
referents) as a function of learning, should unveil the brain mechanisms underlying the emergence 
of semantic representations. Behavioural studies already showed that learning to categorise visual 
objects using labels (that is, linking specific portions of a perceptual space to an abstract symbol 
and therefore creating a meaning, or a semantic representation, for that portion), alters perception, 
facilitating categorization itself (Lupyan et al. 2007) and even altering the perception of the objects 
themselves (Goldstone et al. 1994). This suggests that the way our brain creates new meanings 
through symbols significantly affects its own internal representation of the external world, and that 
the brain mechanisms engaged to solve the symbol-grounding problem might be more profound 
than simply associating two previously separate representations. 
 
In this study, I focused on the neural correlates of learning novel categories of multisensory objects 
by giving them a name, and asked two specific questions: 
i. where and how the new semantic representations emerge, as a function of learning, in the 
human brain? 
ii. how profound are the changes induced by symbolic learning on perceptual 
representations?  
 
I designed a longitudinal learning experiment where a behavioural training was paired with two 
fMRI sessions: one before and one after the training period. Participants learned for 9 days to 
associate novel multisensory objects to written names that represented their categorical identity. I 
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focused on written words because reading is one of the most distinctive abilities humans 
developed in the course of the evolution, strongly linked to the act of creating and conveying 
meanings using symbols, and the processing of which we have a good cognitive and 
neuroscientific understanding (e.g. McCandliss et al. 2003; Dehaene & Cohen 2011). Also, I opted 
for using a multisensory object space because previous studies on categorization focused mostly 
on visual stimuli, thus overlooking other sensory modalities and most of the times not even 
considering their combinations. In real life, however, we constantly integrate information coming 
from different sensory inputs to correctly recognize objects (for instance, I recognize an individual 
by integrating several visual features of her face with the specific sound of her voice), and how this 
multisensory integration relates with the process of creating semantic representations is ignored. 
Before and after learning participants were presented, during an fMRI scanning session, with 
pseudorandom sequences of the very same set of multisensory objects and visual words. While 
before learning they performed a simple one-back task on stimulus identity, after the learning 
period outside the scanner they were actively engaged in an object-name categorization task that 
explicitly required to associate each word to the correct objects, which is akin to the task they were 
performing during their training. In this way, I could properly isolate the brain regions involved in 
the process of grounding symbols to their meaning, and study the effects of this process at the 
whole brain level. 
Methods	
 
Participants. The study included 25 right-handed adult volunteers (fifteen females and ten males; 
mean age = 22.20, std = 2.74). All participants gave written informed consent, underwent 
screening to exclude incompatibilities with the MRI scanner, and were reimbursed for their time. 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Trento (Italy). Data from 4 
subjects were excluded from the analyses given their poor behavioral performance during the 
second fMRI day (accuracy < 70%). This led to a final sample of 21 participants (thirteen females 
and eight males; mean age = 21.95, std = 2.58). 
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Stimulus space. You can refer to Chapter 1, section 1.3 for identical procedures on how the 
stimulus space was created. For the current Chapter, the relevant figures are Figure 2.1 (A-B-C) 
and Figure 2.S1. 
 
Stimuli presentation. You can refer to Chapter 1, section 1.3 for identical procedures on how the 
stimulus space was presented. Behavioural and fMRI sessions were matched for stimuli 
presentation details. 
 
Experimental sessions. The experiment consisted of three parts: pre-learning fMRI, behavioral 
training, and post-learning fMRI (Figure 2.1D). During pre-learning fMRI, participants were 
exposed for the first time to the new multisensory objects and to the abstract names. This allowed 
recording of the patterns of neural activity evoked by the stimuli when they didn’t share any 
relationship. Starting with the following day, subjects underwent nine sessions of behavioral 
training outside the scanner. The aim was to teach them the object-name correspondence, an 
operation requiring parsing of the object space into four categories and connecting each symbol 
(word) to its meaning (the correct category exemplars). Finally, during the post-learning fMRI, they 
were again exposed to the same objects and words, now probing their mutual correspondence, 
and allowing us to record the updated cortical activity. On average, the second fMRI session 
occurred 9.86 days (std = 1.4 days) after the first one. All the tasks are described below. During 
both fMRI sessions, and during the first 8 training days, I used 8 out of 16 objects available in each 
subject’ stimulus space (objects: 1 - 3 - 6 - 8 - 9 - 11 - 14 - 16); the remaining 8 were used only 
during the 9th training session to test for generalization (see below). 
 
Functional localizer. At the start of the pre-learning fMRI session, participants underwent a block-
design functional localizer designed to isolate the cortical regions recruited to process visual and 
acoustic components of our objects, as well as their conjunction. During video mini-blocks, 
participants were presented with animated objects varying in their size, without any acoustic 
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component. During audio mini-blocks participants were presented with sounds varying in pitch, 
without the object visual component. Finally, during multisensory blocks participants were 
presented with multisensory objects: animated objects varying in size, associated with sounds of 
different pitch. There were four blocks for each condition (video, audio, multisensory), resulting in a 
total of twelve mini-blocks of six stimuli each, presented in pseudo-random order. Each block was 
preceded and followed by 10 s of fixation cross. For each block, participants had to perform a 
simple 1-back task, pressing a button whenever they detected a repetition of the same stimulus: 
same size for video blocks; same pitch for audio blocks; same size and same pitch for 
multisensory blocks.  
 
fMRI tasks. During the first fMRI session, participants performed a simple 1-back task on stimulus 
identity, where they were presented with the multisensory objects and the four abstract words in 
pseudorandom order. They were instructed to press a button when they detected an immediate 
repetition of the very same stimulus (either multisensory object or word). In the case of 
multisensory objects, they had to take into account both the size of the object and the pitch of the 
associated sound to provide the correct answer (Figure 2.1E). Each stimulus was presented for 
either 750 ms (objects) or 500 ms (words), with a variable ISI of 4 +/- 1.5 sec during which a blue 
fixation cross was presented. There were 4 runs, each one lasting around 7 minutes. Within a run, 
each stimulus (8 objects and 4 words) was repeated 6 times, resulting in 72 trials per run. There 
was one target event (1-back repetition) per stimulus, for a total of 12 out of 72 (~17%) expected 
responses per run. During the second fMRI session, participants were presented with a 1-back 
task on word-object correspondence, were they had to correctly associate each object to the 
corresponding name. This task could not be performed before learning given the absence of any 
categorical knowledge for our stimulus space. Participants were instructed to press the button 
anytime a multisensory object was followed by the corresponding name (e.g. object 1 followed by 
the word “KER”), and vice versa (e.g. word “KER” followed by object 1), requiring thus access to 
newly learned symbolic identity. This resulted in a total of 16 target events (~ 22%) per run. The 
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number of runs, trials, and stimuli repetition matched the 1-back task on stimulus identity on the 
first fMRI day. 
 
Behavioral training. You can refer to Chapter 1, section 1.3 for identical training procedures. The 
relevant figure for the current Chapter is Figure 2.1F. 
 
Neuroimaging acquisition. Data were collected on a 4T Bruker scanner (Bruker BioSpin) with 
standard head coil, at the Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Italy. Functional 
images were acquired using EPI T2*-weighted scans. Acquisition parameters were as follows: TR 
= 3 s; TE = 21 ms; FA = 81°; FOV = 100 mm; matrix size = 64 x 64; number of slices per volume = 
51, acquired in interleaved ascending order; voxel size = 3 x 3 x 2 mm. T1-weighted anatomical 
images were acquired twice per participant (pre- and post-learning) with an MP-RAGE sequence, 
with 1 x 1 x 1 mm resolution. 
 
Preprocessing and General Linear Model. Functional images were preprocessed using the 
Statistical Parametric Toolbox (SPM8) in MATLAB. Preprocessing included the following steps: 
realignment of each scan to the first of each run; co-registration of functional and session-specific 
anatomical images; segmentation; normalization to the MNI space. No smoothing was applied. 
Functional images for each participant individually were analyzed using a general linear model 
(GLM) separately for the two fMRI sessions. For each run, 22 regressors were included: 13 
regressors of interest, corresponding to the onsets of the eight objects, the four words, and the 
motor response; 6 regressor for head-movements (estimated during motion correction in the pre-
processing); 3 regressors of no interest (constant, linear, and quadratic). Baseline periods were 
modelled implicitly, and regressors were convolved with the standard HRF without derivatives. A 
high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128s was applied to remove low-frequency drift. I thus obtained one 
beta map for each stimulus (eight objects and four words) for each run. 
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Split-half correlation analysis: words and objects identities. First of all I isolated those brain regions 
representing the identities of the 4 words and the 4 objects. To do that I applied a multivariate 
approach (see Haxby et al. 2014), implemented in a whole brain searchlight. A sphere with a 
radius of 3 voxels - selected for consistency with previous studies (Connolly et al. 2012) -  was 
centered in every voxel of the subject- and session-specific datasets. Within each sphere, I 
conducted a split-half correlation analysis (Haxby et al. 2001) that allowed me to test whether the 
distributed activity within a brain region differentiates between stimuli. I extracted, within each 
sphere, the patterns of neural activation across voxels for either the 4 words or the 8 objects, 
separately. Then I divided the dataset into two halves, and I crossed the neural representations of 
each stimulus (either words or objects) with each other, resulting in a correlation matrix with 4x4 
entries for words, and 8x8 entries for objects  (Figure 2A-D): here, the correlation between 
matching stimuli coming from the two different halves laid on-diagonal, while the correlation 
between non matching stimuli laid off-diagonal. If the activity in the ROI is differentiating between 
stimuli identities (that is, is representing differently the four words or the eight multisensory 
objects), the mean difference between Fisher-transformed values on-diagonal versus off-diagonal, 
resulting from all the possible combinations of the two dataset halves, should be positive. For each 
sphere, the resulting correlation score was stored in the center voxel, therefore I obtained one 
correlation map per subject, per session, and per type of stimuli (words or objects). Single-
subjects’ correlation maps were then submitted to group-level analysis to reveal significant clusters 
of voxels where multivariate information was sufficient to distinguish different words and different 
object identities. In the specific case of object identities, to be sure that the resulting clusters were 
sensitive to multisensory information and not to one of the two sensory features (that is, 
differentiating objects only basing on their size or on their pitch), I additionally run two 
corresponding searchlights but looking for brain regions responding to unimodal variations 
between objects. I used the union of these two resulting maps as exclusive mask for the group-
level analysis on object identities, therefore guaranteeing that the resulting clusters were sensitive 
to multisensory conjunction only, that is the real definitional criteria of our individual object 
identities. Spherical ROIs with radius of 8mm were created around the peak voxels, to be sure that 
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following analyses were conducted on Regions of Interest (ROIs) of matching voxel size. 
Corresponding results were obtained when the entire clusters were considered. 
 
Crossmodal correlation analysis. In the brain regions individuated from the two split-half correlation 
analyses, encoding the identity of either the four words or of the 8 objects, I run a crossmodal 
correlation analysis, where I attacked directly the core question of the study, that is the rise of 
mutual correspondence between the representations of objects and the names (symbols) used to 
denote them. By looking in these two areas I put to direct test the hypothesis that brain regions 
representing either words or objects change their activity to reflect the acquired association with 
the corresponding referent or symbol, respectively. In the crossmodal correlation analysis I divided 
the dataset into categories of objects (e.g. objects 1 and 3, or objects 6 and 8) and words, and I 
crossed the neural representation of each object category to the neural representations of each 
name (e.g. ‘KER’ or ‘GAL’), resulting in a 4x4 correlation matrix. I reasoned that if voxels within an 
ROI represent the correct category-name association (e.g. the category composed by objects 1 
and 3, and the word ‘KER’), then the correlation of neural patterns corresponding to matching 
stimuli (on-diagonal) should be higher than that of non-matching ones (off-diagonal). Thus, the 
mean difference between Fisher-r-to-z-transformed on-diagonal vs. off-diagonal values is stored 
for each subject, as summary of the information for the ROI, and subjects’ correlation scores are 
later tested against a null hypothesis of no correlation at the group level. Additionally, to avoid 
overlooking other potential brain regions that could contribute to this association, I implemented 
the same ROI analysis in a whole brain searchlight (for parameters, see above Split half 
correlation analysis). 
 
Decoding stimulus modality (words vs. objects). To investigate the contribution of the brain regions 
individuated by previous analyses, I wanted to quantify, in each region, the extent of abstraction in 
the representation of semantic classes. The neural signature of full abstraction from stimulus 
modality would correspond to an absence of residual information relative to it, that is the 
impossibility to decode whether, at any given trial, subjects were presented with a word or the 
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given corresponding object. In order to test this I implemented a decoding approach, because the 
higher the information on the stimulus modality, the higher the performance of a classifier trained 
with that that information to predict the incoming modality of an independent stimulus. I used a 
leave-one-run-out scheme to train and test a Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) in correctly 
predict the modality of the incoming stimulus, and I stored each subjects’ and ROI’s accuracy for 
later group-level test against a null hypothesis of chance performance (50%). Corresponding 
results are obtained using a Support Vector Machine (SVM). 
 
Perceptual learning and sensory segregation. To investigate is the changes induced by learning 
could be traced down to the activity of sensory regions, I focused on the representational 
geometries of objects in those brain regions that responded separately for their size or their pitch. 
ROIs responding to the visual and to the acoustic components of our multisensory objects were 
isolated on pre-learning imaging data. I selected brain activity evoked at group-level (p<.001; FWE 
corr.) by objects presentation during the 1-back task on stimulus identity. I masked the signal with 
the group-level results (p<.001; FWE corr.) of the functional localizer for either the visual and the 
acoustic modality. This resulted in a bilateral network wherein the Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC) 
and the anterior portions of the Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG) responded to the visual and to the 
acoustic components of our stimuli, respectively (Figure 2.4A). All clusters were binarized and 
used as regions of interest in the following analyses. In absence of a priori hypotheses on the 
lateralization of sensory signals, bilateral ROIs were used. In order to investigate whether the 
activity in sensory areas responding to visual and acoustic components of our objects changed 
after learning, I extracted neural dissimilarity  (1 - Pearson’s correlation) between pairs of all 
objects varying along one sensory dimension only (e.g. between object 1 and object 3, that varied 
in their size but had the same associated sound, Figure 2.4B), and considered their difference 
between the two fMRI sessions as dependent variable. I conducted a 2x2 repeated measures 
ANOVA looking for the interaction between the two ROIs (LOC and STG) and the two sensory 
modalities (distance between objects with different size but same sound, and vice versa). This 
approach was motivated by the fact that I wanted to describe whether the act of connecting objects 
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to their names (which is a fundamental step in the symbol-grounding problem) affected the 
perceptual representations of the referents (here the objects). By taking advantage of a 
longitudinal neuroimaging study, I could compare their neural representations after learning, during 
a semantic categorization task, with a pre-learning condition where no semantic information could 
be retrieved, not even automatically, because it was not part of participants’ knowledge. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Methods. A. Example of audiovisual object. B-C. 16 multisensory objects are created 
as unique audiovisual combinations, and they are divided into four categories by means of abstract 
names. D. Experimental design: two fMRI sessions (pre and post learning) are paired with a 9-
days long training. E. Tasks performed in the fMRI in the two days. F. Training task. 
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Results	
 
During 9 daily sessions of training, 21 healthy volunteers learned to recognise 8 new audiovisual 
animated objects by associating them to one of 4 novel words (Figure 2.1A-B-C). Objects were 
created by varying parametrically and crossing orthogonally the size of an abstract shape and the 
pitch of the sound produced during a little animation (see Methods). The unique object identity was 
therefore multisensory in nature and the correct names could be recovered only by attending to the 
specific combinations of the two sensory features, thus through multisensory integration. I paired 
this behavioural training with two fMRI recording sessions: one pre- and one post- training (Figure 
2.1D, see below). During both sessions, participants were presented with pseudo-random 
sequences of the same 8 audiovisual animated objects and the 4 written words corresponding to 
their category names. Before learning, subjects performed a 1-back task on stimulus identity, while 
after learning they performed 4 runs of a 1-back task on word-object identity explicitly probing the 
newly acquired object-name associations (Figure 2.1E, see Methods) 
 
Behavioral training results. The behavioural training consisted of 9 daily sessions outside the 
scanner, lasting ~ 20 min each (see Methods). During each training session, participants were first 
presented with one of 8 randomly selected audiovisual object per trial (training set), and then with 
the 4 written words in shuffled order (Figure 2.1F). They were told that each object type belong to a 
specific category which had a specific name, and that they had to select the correct word, receiving 
feedback on their performance on every trial. During the last training session, and without being 
notified, participants were also presented with 8 novel stimuli. These consisted in specific 
combination of size and pitch that were absent in the training set, allowing testing for 
generalisation (Supplementary Figure 2A). The learning trajectory indicates an increment in 
performance from session 1 to 4, while from session 5 on participants maintained unchanged their 
accuracy level (session 1: 61 ± 18%; session 2: 76 ± 17%; session 3: 83 ± 13%; session 4: 87 ± 
11%; session 5: 89 ± 10%; session 6: 90 ± 11%; session 7: 91 ± 8%; session 8: 91 ± 7%), 
indicating a period of consolidation (Supplementary Figure 2.2B-C). Performance collected on 
32 
session 9 confirmed both the successful learning of the name-objects association and its 
generalization. Performance was high for both sets (training set: mean accuracy = 88.12%, std = 
5.93%, different from chance t = 29.44, p < .001; generalization set: mean accuracy = 75.03%, std 
= 10.68%, difference from chance, t20 = 10.74, p < .001), even though it was lower for the 
generalization set (t = 5.06, p<.001), indicating that while generalisation did occur, it was not 
perfect (Supplementary Figure 2.2D-E). 
 
Neuroimaging results 
 
The emergence of semantic representations in VWFA. I started by isolating those brain regions 
where multivariate activity differentiated between words’ identities. In a whole brain searchlight I 
implemented a split-half correlation analysis (see Methods) that allows one to test whether a brain 
region represents the different identities of the stimuli considered. Before learning, thus when 
words did not correspond to any object class (namely, they had no meaning), this resulted in two 
significant clusters: one in the right lingual gyrus (MNIx,y,z: 15, -76, -2; t = 5.27) and one in the left 
inferior fusiform gyrus (MNIx,y,z: -45, -61, -8; t = 4.85), a region known as Visual Word Form Area 
(Dehaene & Cohen 2011) (Figure 2.2A-D). Then I asked whether the neural representations of 
those stimuli were modified during learning, and more precisely whether their response to the 
words became more similar to the ones evoked by the corresponding objects (e.g. the word KER 
and object 1) then to the non corresponding ones (e.g. the word KER and object 16). This classical 
view of the role of these regions in reading (representing the lexical orthographic pre-semantic 
stage of processing) would predict no trace of semantic coding. I applied, in these two ROIs, a 
crossmodal correlation analysis (see Methods) that allows one to reveal whether words and the 
corresponding objects are represented similarly, thus suggesting a shared neural code between 
the symbols and their specific referents. I found a significant result in the VWFA (t = 3.74, p = .001) 
but not in the lingual gyrus (t = 0.62, p = .54)(Figure 2.2B). This word-object correspondence was 
not present before learning (t = 1.6, p = .13), when no knowledge of the object-name association 
was present. 
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Figure 2.2 - A shared representation for objects and their categorical names in VWFA. A. 
Split-half correlation analysis reveals individual word representations in VWFA and lingual gyrus. 
Neural DSM for illustrative purposes. B-C. After learning, the representations of words in VWFA 
become more similar to the ones of the corresponding objects.  
 
The emergence of specific representations for each multisensory trained objects. Next, I applied 
the same procedure looking for brain regions showing specific pattern of responses to the different 
object identities. While a whole-brain searchlight on the brain activity before training revealed that 
the objects were not discriminable, after the training three brain regions locally contained 
distributed activity sufficient for discriminating across all individual objects: the left angular gyrus 
(MNIx,y,z: -36, -67, 26; t = 6.8), the left middle frontal gyrus (MFG)(MNIx,y,z:-33, 47, 18; t = 7.82), and 
the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG)(MNIx,y,z: 51, 35, -6; t = 6.98)(Figure 2.2D). In these regions the 
signal coming from unisensory areas is integrated to give rise to the representation of single 
multisensory objects.  
 
The emergence of semantic representations in L-AG. Then, within these three ROIs I applied the 
crossmodal correlation analysis to verify whether concurrently with the differentiation between 
objects they also developed a response of category that  was similar across words and objects 
(the same analysis performed in the VWFA). Of the three regions, only the left angular gyrus (t = 
3.53, p = .002) displayed this coding feature (MFG: t = 0.9, p = .36; IFG: t = 1.73, p = .10)(Figure 
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2.2E). This pattern of similarity in the left Angular Gyrus was absent before learning (t = 1.04, p = 
.31). 
 
Figure 2.3 - A shared representation for objects and their categorical names in left AG. A. 
Split-half correlation analysis reveals individual object representations in left AG, left MFG, right 
IFG.Neural DSM for illustrative purposes. B-C. Object representations in the left AG are more 
similar to the ones of the corresponding names. 
 
A distributed network encoding object-name association. Although our previous results already led 
to drive interesting conclusions on the development of corresponding associations between 
symbols and their referents, I further investigated whether any other brain region represented this 
correspondence. I implemented the crossmodal analysis in a whole brain searchlight that revealed 
an additional set of brain regions that, after learning, represented the association between objects 
and their categorical names: other than the left fusiform gyrus/VWFA (MNIx,y,z: -51, -61, -12; t = 
6.7) and the left Angular Gyrus, here also extending to the Superior Parietal Lobule (MNIx,y,z: -27, -
58, 46; t = 6.6), that confirmed the findings revealed in the previous ROI approach, categorical and 
modality invariant information was also present in the right Superior Parietal Lobule (MNIx,y,z: 21, -
73, 54; t = 6.6), in the right Inferior Parietal Lobule (MNIx,y,z: 57, -46, 46; t = 5.1), in the right Angular 
Gyrus/ Temporo-parietal Junction (MNIx,y,z: 54, -67, 34; t = 5.25), and in the right Hippocampus 
(MNIx,y,z: 27, -22, -6; t = 5.14) (Figure 2.4A). Before learning, no region showed this effect. 
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Tolerance to variations in the stimulus presentation modality. How do these areas support the 
emergence of object-name association? While VWFA and the left Angular Gyrus also encode the 
identity of single word and of single objects, respectively, and developed a similarity between 
matching symbol-referent pairs, the right-lateralized ROIs emerged only after the crossmodal 
searchlight. This raises the possibility that these brain regions show a higher level of invariance to 
the presentation modality, which could be potentially useful to construct the object-name 
association. To test this hypothesis I implemented a decoding procedure where I trained a Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) classifier to predict the sensory modality of the presented stimulus 
(word or object) (see Methods). Although I selected these ROIs for the fact that they similarly 
respond to objects and their corresponding names, I don’t know the degree of their sensitivity to 
differences in the two presentation modalities - which, however, should be trivial for a classifier to 
capture, given the extremely different lower-level perceptual features between the audiovisual 
objects compared to the written words. The classifier accuracy was indeed very high, especially in 
the left-lateralized ROIs (VWFA: mean accuracy = 64%; t = 6.14, p = 5.25x10-6; L-AG/SPL: mean 
accuracy = 59%; t = 5.15, p = 4.77x10-5), and decreased as I moved to right regions, and from 
superior cortical structures down to the hippocampus, where the performance of the classifier did 
not diverge from chance (R-SPL: mean accuracy = 59%; t = 4.70, p = 1.35x10-4; R-IPL: mean 
accuracy = 56%; t = 3.66, p = .001; R-AG/TPJ: mean accuracy = 55%; t = 2.41, p = .026; R-HPC: 
mean accuracy = 52%; t = 1.60, p = .12)(Figure 2.4B). 
 
Correlation with behavioural performance. Finally, I correlated the crossmodal correlation scores in 
the areas of our network with the behavioural performance collected at the end of the training, 
before the second fMRI session. I found that the degree of similarity between the neural 
representations of the objects and their corresponding names in the right hippocampus 
significantly correlated with overall behavioural performance during the last day of training (R= 
0.58, p = .006)(Figure 2.3D), while none of the other areas showed this effect (all p>.17). 
Interestingly, the correlation remained significant when restricting the categorization performance 
during the last training day to only the subset of novel (generalized) objects (R = 0.54, p = 0.012). 
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Figure 2.4 - A temporo-parietal network supporting the emergence of semantic 
representations and the role of the right Hippocampus. A. Whole-brain results of the 
crossmodal correlation searchlight (S/IPL = Superior/Inferior Parietal Lobule; HPC = 
Hippocampus). B. A LDA classifier trained to discriminate the presentation modality shows 
decreasing performance as we move from left to right ROIs, and specifically down to the right 
HPC. C. Neural DSM of crossmodal correlation in r-HPC. D. Crossmodal correlation score in r-
HPC significantly correlates with behaviour during the last training day (test day), when novel and 
generalized objects are presented. 
 
Perceptual learning and sensory segregation. Finally, I focused on the second question I wanted to 
attack with this experiment, that is to what extent the effects of symbolic categorical learning also 
affect sensory coding of the object features. With our split-half object-based correlation analysis I 
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already demonstrated an increased sharpening of the representation of individual multisensory 
object identities after learning, during our symbolic categorization task, in a frontoparietal network. 
Does this effect extend to lower level perceptual regions, that could potentially inform and support 
higher-level multisensory integration, necessary to the task at hand? To answer the question, I 
looked for evidence of sharpening of the differences along unisensory modalities in their specific 
sensory regions (e.g. differences in sound frequency within acoustic sensory cortices) and, 
additionally, in the sensory regions responding to the opposite modality (e.g. differences in sound 
frequency within visual cortices responding to size). I approached the problem by first selecting, 
through a independent functional localizer, visual and acoustic ROIs - bilateral Occipital Cortex 
(LOC) and anterior Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG) respectively - responding selectively to the 
visual and acoustic components of our multisensory objects (see Methods)(Figure 2.5A). Thus, on 
the basis of previous report of plastic properties of sensory areas showing an increase in precision 
of visual and acoustic information as a function of unisensory learning (e.g. Jiang et al. 2007; 
2018), I asked whether similar perceptual learning effects can be detected with our design. To 
answer the question, I investigated if and how unisensory regions modify their representations of 
each sensory feature separately. In each of the two sensory ROIs, I compared the neural 
representational dissimilarity (1 - Pearson’s r)(see Methods) before and after training, between 
objects varying along each of the two dimensions separately, and used an ANOVA to compare 
perceptual learning (indexed by the difference in dissimilarity between the two fMRI sessions) 
across regions and sensory features (Figure 2.5B). The ANOVA revealed a significant interaction  
between changes along sensory dimensions (size vs pitch) and ROIs (LOC vs aSTG)(F = 8.13, p = 
.009)(Figure 2.5C). This indicated that training induced a form of sensory segregation in sensory 
regions: both regions developed an increased sensitivity for the preferred sensory dimension, and 
that was paired with a decreased discriminability between differences along the non-preferred one. 
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Figure 2.5 - Perceptual segregation in sensory areas. A. LOC and STG respond to the visual 
and acoustic components of our objects, respectively. B. Neural dissimilarity is compared between 
objects varying only along one sensory modality, and between the two session (pre post) and 
ROIs. C. Significant interaction reveals sensory segregation. 
	
Discussion	
 
In this study, I attacked the question of how novel semantic representations, that are meaningful 
representations of object classes conveyed by symbols, emerge in the brain. I reported three main 
findings: i) an increased similarity between the neural representations of symbols (words) and their 
referents (the objects they refer to) emerge in the VWFA and in the left Angular Gyrus, two areas 
that also encode the identity of the individual words and individual objects, respectively; ii) beyond 
these left-lateralized regions, also a set of right-lateralized areas - encompassing superior and 
inferior parietal cortices and the hippocampus - support the emergence of this shared neural 
similarity and, among those, the right hippocampus shows full invariance to presentation modality 
and strong correlation between its multivariate activity and behavioural performance on the last 
training day (test day); iii) processing the object-name correspondence also drives changes in the 
representation of multisensory objects, in the form of increased sensory segregation in those lower 
perceptual regions that code for either their visual or their acoustic component. 
 
The emergence of lexico-semantic representations of words in the Visual Word Form Area 
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The posterior portion of the left occipitotemporal sulcus plays a key role in reading (Dehaene & 
Cohen 2011), being sensitive to the presentation of written words over objects (Cohen et al. 2000), 
and invariant to changes in the location (Cohen et al. 2000), in case (Dehaene et al. 2001, 2004), 
or font (Quiao et al. 2010) of the presented words. The area was named Visual Word Form Area 
(VWFA), and its role as inferred from imaging studies was consistent by neuropsychological 
evidence: patients with lesions to the VWFA develop severe pure alexia, that is the loss of the 
ability to efficiently identify visually presented words irrespective of their lexical or semantic status 
(Cohen et al. 2000, 2003; Starrfelt et al. 2009; Mani et al. 2008). These results have been 
replicated many times (e.g. Jobard et al. 2003 for a meta-analysis), and have been further 
strengthened by longitudinal training studies showing that the degree of literacy of both adults and 
children correlates with the activation of this area during word identification (Dehaene et al. 2010; 
Cantlon et al. 2011). In the present study, I proved that the VWFA differently represents, in its 
multivariate activity pattern, the identity of short pseudo-words that subjects did not encounter 
before and thus had no meaning. This is the first time, to our knowledge, that individual word 
identities could be differentiated from the activity patterns in VWFA, and this is likely due to the 
presence of only 4 words in our design. Moreover, and crucially, I demonstrated that after a 
symbolic categorical training where participants learned to map these words onto categories of 
novel multisensory objects, the representational geometry of the VWFA also reflected the newly 
acquired object-name similarity. This result significantly extends the previous body of work linking 
the VWFA to an orthographic level of encoding only, by showing that its plastic properties might 
also support the link between the visual form of a word and the meaning it refers to. Recent works 
suggested indeed that the multivariate activity of this area is affected by the semantic content of 
the words if that is relevant for the task that subjects are performing. Want et al. (2018) report that 
the multivariate activity patterns of the VWFA evoked by known words during different semantic 
tasks significantly correlates with the semantic information they convey and that is relevant for the 
ongoing task: the similarity of the neural representation of words in the VWFA between two words 
like “doctor” and “teacher”, or between “hospital” and “school” is high during a taxonomic task that 
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requires to judge the similarity of words on the bases of their taxonomic membership (people vs 
locations), while it is low during a thematic task that enhance contextual information, and that 
would predict an higher similarity between, for instance, “doctor” and “hospital”, or “teacher” and 
“school”. Crucially, this pattern was inverted when participants were actively engaged in a thematic 
semantic task, showing that the multivariate activity of the VWFA represents semantic information 
and adapt to the ongoing task-setting and behaviour. In my experiment I could demonstrate that 
the plastic properties of this area allow for the emergence of a shared neural code between the 
words and their referent that was not present before learning. 
 
The emergence of object identities and semantic representation in the left Angular Gyrus 
 
While my previous findings showed that a brain region coding for lexical/orthographic properties of 
novel words (VWFA) developed, after learning, an increased similarity between these words (the 
symbols) and the objects belonging to the category they refer to (their referent, or meaning), I 
additionally seek for the specular pattern by looking for those brain regions where object identities 
were represented, to see whether they also developed a response to words that reflected the 
newly acquired object-name similarity. Surprisingly I did not find evidence of individual object 
representations before learning, despite an almost perfect task performance (>90% of correct 
responses). A possible explanation for this null finding is that participants were not integrating the 
visual and acoustic features in a single individual combination, but they were rather processing 
size and pitch separately to solve the one-back identity task. Interestingly, such individual 
representations emerged after learning, when participants had to recover their names, in a fronto-
parietal network encompassing the left Angular Gyrus, the left middle frontal gyrus, and the right 
inferior frontal gyrus. While a central role of the L-AG in supporting semantic memory is widely 
accepted (Binder et al. 2009; Binder & Desai 2011), little was previously known with respect to its 
precise function and nature of semantic coding schemes. Given its anatomical position, the L-AG 
well suits as convergence zone (Damasio 1989, Binder & Desai 2011) to integrate information 
coming from lower sensory regions. Indeed, recent studies indicated its causal role during 
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multisensory integration (Bonnici et al. 2016; Yazar et al. 2017). These findings are coherent with 
our discovery that the representation of individual objects which identity is defined by the 
integration of specific visual and audio properties emerge in this region. Crucially, the emergence 
of a representation of the individual objects was paired with an increased representational 
similarity between the objects and the symbols that identify them. This is suggestive of similarities 
with the case of numbers, that in the IPS, known to represent quantities, evoke similar 
representations both when quantities are presented in their symbolic (as Arab digits) and non-
symbolic (as dots) form (Piazza et al. 2007). This might indicate that the human brain employes a 
parsimonious solution to the symbol-grounding problem, mapping symbols representations directly 
onto those neural circuits that respond to the objects these symbols refer to. Less clear, in this 
respect, is the role of the frontal regions that, although representing individual object identities, did 
not develop similarity between their representation and the one of their names. Previous studies in 
the field of object recognition and categorization indicates that lateral prefrontal cortices are 
involved in the process of recognizing objects and their categories (e.g. Riesenhuber & Poggio 
2002, Jiang et al. 2007; 2018) and that these effects are modulated by the task (Roy et al. 2010; 
Van der Linden 2014). Also, it has been shown that the same areas contribute to support working 
memory in a variety of perceptual and categorization tasks (Lara & Wallis 2015; Miller et al. 2018). 
Although with the current experiment I can not find a precise answer to what contribution these 
regions are actually offering to the symbol-grounding problem, I could speculate that their role 
might be more related to the act of holding in memory the identity of the current object which, being 
ambiguous and more difficult to discern compared to words, might require an extra effort, for which 
their contribution could be essential. 
 
The crossmodal network and the role of the right hippocampus 
 
A crucial step in our analyses was to search, using a whole brain searchlight, for other regions 
where the object-name similarity was present after learning. This was motivated by the fact that to 
solve the symbol-grounding problem the association might emerge not only in the specific regions 
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representing the symbol or its referent(s), as I showed above, but also in separate areas, less 
dependent to the perceptual format of the incoming stimulus, but coding for their similarity in a 
more abstract way. I did find a set of regions responding to this criterion in the right parietal and in 
the hippocampal cortices. Crucially, I saw a pattern of increasing abstraction (as indicated by a 
decrease in stimulus presentation format classification accuracy) as I moved from the VWFA and 
the left AG to the right hemisphere and down to the right hippocampus, where the performance of 
our classifier was the worst. A possible explanation of this null result in the HPC is the well 
established problem of signal loss from the medial temporal lobe (Schmidt et al. 2005; Bellgowan 
et al. 2006; Olman et al. 2009), that however wouldn’t fit with the strong positive result of the cross-
modal correlation analysis. A more interesting and more plausible alternative explanation posits 
that the hippocampus might be truly involved in constructing the relevant semantic association 
between a symbol and its referent, thus acting as interface to support the symbol-referent 
association. Indeed, previous studies showed that the hippocampus is crucial in representing the 
association between the neural representations of objects or, separately, words pairs (Spiers et al. 
2001; Giovanello & Keane 2003; Clark et al. 2018). Additionally, it contains neurons that are highly 
selective to specific stimuli identities (e.g. pictures of a specific place) but highly invariant to the 
presentation modality of its identity, responding to the same stimulus identity whether it is 
presented as a picture, as a hand drawing, or even as a spoken or written word (Quiroga et al. 
2005; 2012). I observed a strong correlation between the degree of specificity of the similarity 
between words and their relative objects in the right hippocampus and the performance on the last 
training day, during which participants were precisely tested in matching the objects to their 
names. Crucially, in this last testing session I  presented participants with the same old objects that 
they have been trained on and also with novel exemplars, representing audiovisual combinations 
that subjects had never seen before. The significant correlation between HPC object-name 
similarity with the behaviour remained also when I considered only the new, generalized, objects. 
This suggests that the hippocampus likely holds a representation that goes beyond a simple 
episodic association of a particular object exemplar with a particular word. A recent study by 
Blumenthal et al. (2017) reported the case of an amnesic patient with well documented 
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hippocampal lesion, who showed severe deficits in producing semantic features for well-known 
object concepts when they referred to contextual informations, such as how to typically use an 
object or where to find it. This report suggested that semantic and episodic memory might not be 
completely separated as classically assumed. Recent theoretical works (Mack et al. 2017; Morton 
et al. 2017) suggests that the hippocampus might actually contribute in the course of concept 
learning by means of pattern separation and pattern completion, that allow to differentiate 
overlapping experiences for behavioural purposes, as well as integrating those aspects of these 
experiences that shares commonalities. This might provide a framework to interpret the role of 
hippocampus in our experiment: during and after the course of the training, it might have 
developed a representation of object categories by integrating all the common aspects of individual 
instances of a category and by separating, or abstracting from, those details that do not repeat 
themselves across the different expositions of the same category. In the case of different 
exemplars of KER, for instance, the hippocampus might have developed a representation of the 
core definitional aspects of the category KER, that of being a small object producing a low sound, 
without representing the perceptual variability within the category. This would allow for a later 
generalization to novel exemplars when their linguistic label had to be retrieved - exactly as we 
observed.  In this perspective, the hippocampus might play a crucial role in solving the symbol-
grounding problem. Future studies should further investigate this idea with complementary 
methods to non-invasive neuroimaging. One possibility is the study of clinical patients with lesions 
to their hippocampus, that might reveal that they are indeed unable, or less proficient, to generalize 
an associative rule such as the one existing between an object and its name to novel exemplars. 
Additionally, intracranial recordings on epileptic patients that are implanted for clinical reasons 
should address whether an increased neuronal response encoding the association between an 
object and its name emerge during and/or after learning, as it happens for object-object 
associations (Ison et al. 2014).  
What remains surprising is the right lateralization of the peak I observed. The right hippocampus is 
usually associated to visuo-spatial memory, which doesn’t bear any relevance to our experimental 
design, unless we interpret our novel semantic space as a cognitive space (Bellmund et al. 2018) 
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which structure can be captured in a spatial format. This is not a novel idea, and an increase 
number of studies is showing how brain regions holding specific spatially-tuned representational 
code recruits the same mechanisms to represent abstract information (e.g. Constantinescu et al. 
2016, Garvert et al. 2017) in the form of an internal cognitive map of memories and concepts 
(Behrens et al. 2018; Bellmund et al. 2018). A very recent study by Theves et al. (2019) indeed 
found that the hippocampus encodes distances between well-known objects that are learned, by 
adult participants, as specific points of a novel bidimensional space. Future studies should more 
directly address this possibility and explore whether and how these mechanisms are crucial during 
semantic learning. 
 
Perceptual segregation in sensory regions 
 
Finally, I investigated the effects of symbolic categorization on the neural representations of 
objects in perceptual regions. While the acoustic and the visual components of the audio-visual 
objects were conjointly encoded in the L-AG after training, the two sensory features defining each 
object identity were also separately processed in perceptual areas of the visual and acoustic 
pathways (Mishkin et al. 1983; Rauschecker & Tian 2000; Obseler et al. 2008). However, learning 
to map object identities onto the representation on words (and viceversa) changed anterior STG 
and LOC responses to sensory stimuli, which developed an enhanced sensitivity to differences 
along their preferred sensory modality: i.e., acoustic areas became more sensitive to differences in 
the sounds produced by objects; visual areas becomes more sensitive to differences in the size of 
the objects. Concurrently, they developed a decreased sensitivity to differences along the non-
preferred one: i.e., acoustic areas became less sensitive to differences in the size of the objects; 
visual areas became less sensitive to difference in the sound produced by the objects. I relate 
these results to two well-known behavioural effects occurring during categorical learning (Gibson & 
Gibson 1955; Gibson & Walk 1956; Vanderplas et al. 1964). In tasks were subjects learn to 
discriminate objects on the basis of single dimensions, while their sensitivity to that dimension 
increases (so called ’acquired distinctiveness’ effect (Lawrence 1949), their sensitivity to 
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concurrent changes in task irrelevant dimensions decreases (so called ‘acquired equivalence’ 
effect (Waller 1970)). These observations lead to the idea that training ‘warps’ representational 
spaces such that the perceptual distance (or dissimilarity) between features changes (Harnad 
1987; Goldstone 1994a,b). Past imaging work supported this idea but were restricted to unisensory 
visual (e.g. Kourtzi et al. 2005; Op de Beeck et al. 2006; Op de Beeck & Backer 2010; Folstein et 
al. 2013; Brants et al. 2016) or acoustic stimuli (Ahveninee et al. 2011, Ley 2012, 2014; Bao 2015). 
Whether and how these effects extend to multisensory stimulations has been largely ignored. 
Lemus et al. (2010) for example recorded single neurons in macaque monkeys discriminating, on 
interleaved trials, between two tactile or two acoustic stimuli. While several neurons in the 
somatosensory cortices and primary auditory cortex responded to both visual and auditory stimuli, 
the stimulus identity could only be decoded from responses to their principal sensory modality. 
Thus, the authors suggested that during multisensory stimulation the representations of the 
different sensory modalities compete against each other, and sensory cortices select one over the 
other, according to their perceptual preference. The results of the present experiment are 
congruent with this view, as I observed that within sensory regions, information along the non-
relevant sensory modality was reduced/suppressed (acquired equivalence), in favour of higher 
sensitivity for relevant sensory differences (acquired distinctiveness). These kinds of “suppressive” 
effects may be entirely overlooked in multisensory stimulation experiments where the different 
sensory features of stimuli often do not orthogonally vary but, rather, are correlated and thus 
predictive of one another. In this experiment, on the contrary, the two sensory features varied 
orthogonally, such that allowing one modality to interfere with the encoding of the other would 
reduce accuracy in stimulus recognition, the task that subjects were asked to perform. In this 
sense, the amount and type of multisensory integration that can be observed in early sensory 
cortices might be crucially determined by the task and stimuli features used during the experiment 
at hand, and future work should further and directly investigate their specific role in influencing 
multisensory information coding in sensory areas, during both symbolic and non-symbolic tasks.  
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Supplementary	material	
 
 
 
Figure 2.S1 - Psychophysical validation. A-B. Two independent tasks are utilized to extract the 
Just Noticeable Difference for each participant, using QUEST (Watson and Pelli, 1987). C. 
Participants have very different perceptual sensitivities, and each perceptual space is created on 
their individual scores. 
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Figure 2.S2 - Training results. A. Different objects are used to train participants and to test for 
generalization. B-C. The learning curve suggests an initial period of learning (sessions 1 to 4) and 
a subsequent period of consolidation (5 to 8) D-E. Performance on the last day (test day) reveals 
that subjects not only learned to correctly recognise the familiar objects, but also novel 
combinations, indicating a generalization of the categorical multisensory space that represents the 
meaning of the novel words. 
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NAVIGATING	A	NOVEL	SEMANTIC	SPACE	
WITH	DISTANCE	AND	DIRECTIONAL	CODES	
IN	THE	HUMAN	BRAIN		
Introduction	
 
Humans and animals have a remarkable ability to orient themselves in space. When we 
leave our office after a busy working day, we can effortlessly find our way home in the myriad of 
roads of our city and, in the unfortunate case that the typical route we take is stuck in traffic, we 
can take a different path to the same destination by surveying the memory we have of the city and 
selecting an alternative route. The ability to adapt our behaviour in such a flexible way derives from 
the fact that we stored, in our memory, the knowledge of the city, in terms of where locations of 
interest are, how distant they are from each other and, by consequence, what are the possible 
pathways that connect them. In the late 40s Tolman (1949) observed a very similar ability in rats 
navigating an experimental maze, and he coined the term “cognitive map” to refer to the internal 
knowledge that they acquired about the experimental setting and the relationships between its 
elements, such as the distances between different locations or the position of corners, that enabled 
the animals to easily find shortcuts or alternative routes when obstacles blocked their way to the 
reward. The neural bases of this spatial knowledge have been described in the following decades, 
when the hippocampal formation and surrounding areas (for instance retrosplenial cortex and 
medial prefrontal regions) have been proven to contain spatially-tuned neurons, such as place-
cells (O’Keefe & Dostrovksy 1979) and grid-cells (Hafting et al. 2005) that, taken together, 
contribute to the representation of the animal’s current location and its memory of the surrounding 
environment. The so-called grid cells, in particular, fire at multiple locations covering the entire 
navigable surface with a precise triangular periodicity, and are thought to contribute in estimating 
the distances between points of the physical space to construct a spatial cognitive map (Bush et al. 
2015). Crucially, place- and grid-cells have been later observed in humans, during virtual-reality 
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spatial navigation, using both intracranial recordings (Jacobs et al. 2013) and fMRI (Doeller et al. 
2010), not only in the hippocampal formation (mostly entorhinal cortex) but also in medial 
prefrontal regions, known for their contribution to associative learning and spatial memory and for 
their strong connections with the hippocampus (see Preston & Eichenbaum 2013 for a review). 
 
A recent proposal posits that humans might use the same neuronal machinery to support an 
internal representation of non-spatial memories and experiences, recruiting the same neural codes 
to organise their abstract knowledge in a “cognitive map” of concepts (Behrens et al. 2018; 
Bellmund et al. 2018). This proposal comes from a set of complementary observations. First of all, 
the same brain regions where spatially-tuned neurons have been recorded (mostly hippocampus, 
entorhinal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex), are also activated during non-spatial tasks, 
supporting abstract decision making (Schuck et al. 2015; Schuck et al. 2016; Kaplan et al. 2017), 
and representing, for instance, temporal sequences (Eichenbaum 2014), social spaces (Tavares et 
al. 2015, Kaplan & Friston 2019), and associative and hierarchical spaces (Dusek and 
Eichenbaum 1997; Heckers et al 2004; Zeithmanova et al. 2012). Second, in very particular 
experimental situations, these areas show a 6-fold periodic modulation of their BOLD signal that is 
consistent with the one observed during spatial navigation - most likely originating from grid cells 
activity (Doeller et al. 2010) - but during tasks that bear little, if any, similarity with navigation of 
physical environments, such as imagined navigation (Bellmund et al. 2016), visual search (Julian 
et al. 2018; Nau et al. 2018), or processing of morphing objects in a 2D visual space 
(Constantinescu et al. 2016). Finally, in rats and monkeys, lesioning or interfering with mPFC or 
the hippocampal formation prevents animals to perform tasks where behavioural flexibility is 
required, such as learning the abstract structure of the task, adapt to reversal learning rules, 
generalize their knowledge through transitive inference, or finding new shortcuts within a maze 
(Dusek and Eichenbaum 1997; Buckmaster et al. 2004; Walton et al. 2010; Takahashi et al. 2011; 
Jones et al. 2012; Koscik and Tranel 2012; Gilboa et al. 2014; Wikenheiser eand Schoenbaum 
2016). Taken together, these findings led to the proposal of a shared neuronal machinery for both 
spatial navigation and high level, concept based, cognition. 
50 
 
But what does it mean to have a “cognitive map” of concepts? A similar intuition had emerged in 
the fields of neurolinguistic and computational linguistic, where scholars tend to interpret concepts 
(usually represented by words) as regions or points in an internal space (semantic space), with 
proximities reflecting similarity in meaning (e.g., see Borghesani and Piazza, 2017). If the idea of 
conceptual spaces is more than a metaphor, and if the human brain uses the same neuronal 
machinery used to represent and navigate in physical space to represent and navigate complex 
conceptual spaces, two predictions follow. First, the activity of those brain regions involved in 
representing the “cognitive map” of the conceptual space relevant to the task at hand, should also 
reflect the actual pattern of distances between concepts, when they are considered as regions of 
an abstract space (the “cognitive space”) which coordinates are the dimensions, or features, that 
define those concepts. Second, moving between concepts in memories should involve the same 
direction-dependent neural codes observed in lower level mammals and humans when they 
navigate the physical space. To date, evidence supporting these two predictions for human 
conceptual knowledge is still missing, mostly because it is extremely difficult to reduce complex 
human conceptual representations to low dimensional spaces that allows a comparison with the 
navigable physical environment. 
 
Here I was interested in studying whether and where the human brain holds a cognitive map of 
complex concepts, by representing their mutual distances. Additionally, I seek for evidence of 
directional coding that could be complementary to a distance code. There are at least two 
definitional criteria for human-like conceptual representations as we intend, and use, in everyday 
life: that of referring to objects/events classes, or categories, and that of being accessed and 
manipulated using symbols, such as words or numbers. Because well known concepts are 
multidimensional in nature and their multiple semantic properties might interfere with our scope, I 
applied this approach to the same set of data described in Chapter 2, where we created a novel, 
artificial, but highly controlled conceptual space composed by audiovisual objects that are divided 
into four categories by means of linguistic labels (words) (Figure 3.1A-B)(see Methods). Twenty-
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five adult participants learned to assign each one of the novel objects to a particular category 
during 9 days of behavioural training. Before and after learning, they were presented with 
pseudorandom sequences of objects and words and, after learning (because before learning it was 
impossible) they were asked to bear in mind the conceptual identity of either the object or the word 
to perform a one back categorization task (see Methods). I reasoned that, for a cognitive map to 
exist in a brain region, the activity evoked by stimuli referred to different regions of the semantic 
space should reflect the distance existing between them: the closer two concepts are in the 
semantic space, the closer (or similar) their representations should be. Additionally, I reasoned that 
subsequent presentations of words and objects referring to different categories implied a specific 
direction travelled within the conceptual space. Therefore, my data were suitable for investigating 
the existence of both a distance and a directional representational code underlying the 
representation of a semantic space (Figure 3.1C)(see Methods). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Methods. A. Exemplar of audiovisual object. B. 16 multisensory objects are divided 
into 4 categories by means of abstract words: this creates a novel multisensory semantic space. C. 
Subsequent presentations of either objects or words imply a movement between the regions of the 
semantic space. These movements cover a certain distance, and have particular directions. 
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Methods	
 
Participants. You can refer to Chapter 2, section Methods-Participants for identical procedures on 
the experimental sample.  
 
Conceptual space. You can refer to Chapter 1, section Methods-Conceptual space for identical 
procedures on how the conceptual space was created. For the current Chapter, the relevant 
figures are Figure 2.1 (A-B). 
 
Stimuli presentation. You can refer to Chapter 1, section Methods-Stimuli presentation for identical 
procedures. 
  
Experimental design. You can refer to Chapter 2, section Methods-Experimental design for 
identical procedures. 
  
fMRI tasks. You can refer to Chapter 2, section Methods-fMRI tasks for identical procedures. 
 
Behavioural Training. You can refer to Chapter 1, section Methods-Behavioural Training for 
identical procedures. 
 
Neuroimaging acquisition and Preprocessing. You can refer to Chapter 2, section Methods-
Neuroimaging acquisition and Preprocessing for identical procedures. 
  
Adaptation analysis. First of all, I assessed what brain regions, after learning, represented the 
reciprocal distances between the four concepts. I did that by means of adaptation, reasoning that, 
under the cognitive map hypothesis, a large distance (e.g. from KER to GAL) travelled in the 
conceptual space should result in an higher release from adaptation compared to a small distance 
(e.g. from KER to MOS). Functional images for each participant individually were analysed using a 
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general linear model (GLM). For each run, 14 regressors were included: 1 regressor for each pair 
of trials of no interest where no movement happened (e.g. two subsequent stimuli referring to the 
same category); 2 regressors of interest modelling pairs of trials where either a small or a large 
movement happened in the conceptual space (Figure. 3.2A); 1 regressor indicating that there was 
a change in the presentation modality (from object to word or viceversa); 1 regressor for motor 
response; 6 regressor for head-movements (estimated during motion correction in the pre-
processing); 3 regressors of no interest (constant, linear, and quadratic). Baseline periods were 
modelled implicitly, and regressors were convolved with the standard HRF (without derivatives). A 
high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 s was applied to remove low-frequency drifts. I applied group-
level analysis within SPM to find brain regions showing a significant adaptation effect for trials 
where the movement covered a large distance over those where the movement covered a small 
distance (Family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons at cluster level was applied 
at α = 0.05). 
 
Distance-based Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA). In the brain region individuated, at the 
group level, from the adaptation analysis, I implemented multivariate pattern analysis (MVPa), 
which is complementary to adaptation. To do that, I run a second GLM. For each run, 22 
regressors were included: 1 regressor for each one of the 8 multisensory objects (resulting in 8 
regressors); 1 regressor for each one for he 4 words (resulting in 4 regressors); 1 regressor for 
motor response; 6 regressor for head-movements (estimated during motion correction in the pre-
processing); 3 regressors of no interest (constant, linear, and quadratic). Baseline periods were 
modelled implicitly, and regressors were convolved with the standard HRF without derivatives. A 
high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 s was applied to remove low-frequency drifts. I thus obtained 
one beta map for each stimulus (object or word) and run. I used these beta maps to conduct a 
model-based RSA (Kriegeskoorte et al. 2008). I averaged the beta maps for all the stimuli that 
belonged to the same concept (e.g. two objects that are a KER and the word “KER”) and I 
extracted, from the Region of Interest (ROI) obtained in the previous analysis, the neural 
dissimilarity matrix (DSM, 1-Pearson’s correlation) to reveal their distances in the multivariate 
54 
representational space. Next I correlated the Fisher transformed DSM to the predicted matrix 
representing the distances between our concepts (Figure 3.2C). As a control, I repeated the same 
analysis using pre-learning data, when participants did not have any knowledge of the conceptual 
space and therefore the distance model should not correlate with the neural data. Finally, to further 
confirm that no other brain region represented the distance between our novel concepts in the 
multivariate activity pattern, I run a whole brain searchlight: a sphere was centred in every voxel of 
the subject- and session-specific datasets, following previous searchlight studies (Connolly et al. 
2012). Within each sphere I conducted the same model-based RSA previously conducted in the 
ROI. I used SPM to test for group level effects, after subtracting the results of two additional 
searchlights (with matching parameters) that used model-based RSA to look for brain regions 
responding to differences in either size or pitch, respectively, of the multisensory objects: this was 
a necessary step to exclude that the multivariate correlation score I obtained was explained by a 
low-level perceptual coding of differences between objects. Family-wise error (FWE) correction 
was applied at α = 0.05 to correct for multiple comparisons at cluster level. Additionally, I used the 
neural DSM to reconstruct, using multidimensional scaling as implemented in MATLAB, the most 
faithful bidimensional representation of the conceptual space, to visualize the spatial arrangement 
of the four concepts starting from real neural data, and I did it for both pre and post learning 
datasets. 
 
Direction-based RSA. Next, I asked whether BOLD activity evoked during the transition between 
two stimuli referring to different concepts was modulated by the direction of the movement in the 
conceptual space. To do that, I first run a third GLM, now modelling the directions of movement 
between concepts. For each run, 20 regressors were included: 8 regressors corresponded to the 8 
possible directions of movement within the conceptual space, arbitrarily referenced to the 
horizontal axis; 1 regressor modelling subsequent presentation of two stimuli that belonged to the 
same conceptual region, corresponding with no movement across the conceptual environment; 1 
regressor for changes in presentation modality (e.g. from object to word or vice versa); 1 regressor 
for participants’ response; 6 regressor for head-movements (estimated during motion correction in 
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the pre-processing); 3 regressors of no interest (constant, linear, and quadratic). Baseline periods 
were modelled implicitly, and regressors were convolved with the standard HRF without 
derivatives. A high-pass filter with a cutoff of 128 s was applied to remove low-frequency drifts. I 
thus obtained one beta map for each movement direction for each run. In the ROI defined by 
previous analysis, I applied an extension of the similarity-based multivariate approach of Bellmund 
et al. (2016) to test for the existence of a hexadirectional code in our data, most likely originating 
from the activity of grid-cells (Doeller et al. 2010). Two movement directions 𝜑 and 𝜑’ in the interval 
0°-359° can be expressed as more or less similar in a n-fold periodic space, by calculating mod(𝜑-𝜑’, θ), where θ indicates the angle of the periodic (n-fold) grid for which I want to test the 
modulation. In the case of a grid-like signal, corresponding to a 6-fold periodicity, θ = 60°, and 
therefore two directions perfectly aligned with a periodicity of 60° would have mod(𝜑-𝜑’, 60°) = 0. 
However, if the two directions are not perfectly aligned in the n-fold symmetry, the result of the 
mod() function indicates the angular distance to perfect alignment. I computed all the 8x8 pairwise 
comparisons between our sampled movement directions to obtain a model of their predicted 6-fold 
dissimilarity, corresponding to the angular deviation in the 60° periodic space (Figure 3.3A-B). 
Next, I applied model-based RSA correlating the 6-fold model to the Fisher transformed neural 
dissimilarity matrix (DSM) constructed by computing similarity distance (1-Pearson’s r) between 
any pair of distributed activity patterns in the ROI. I computed the correlation between neural data 
and the model using Pearson’s r. To investigate whether this modulation was detectable at the 
whole brain level, I used the CoSMoMVPa toolbox (Oosterhof et al. 2016) to implement this 
analysis in a whole-brain searchlight to find cortical regions responding to the 6-fold rotational 
symmetry. A sphere was centred in every voxel of the subject- and session-specific datasets, 
following previous searchlight studies (Connolly et al. 2012). Within each sphere I conducted our 
model-based grid-RSA, storing the resulting correlation score in the center voxel, as summary of 
the information for the surrounding sphere. To control for potentially competitive periodicities, I 
applied the same technique within the resulting ROIs, now using periodic models with 4-, 5-, or 7-
fold symmetries. 
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Results	
 
The main goal of the study was to investigate whether and where a (cognitive) map of our novel, 
multisensory conceptual space would be represented in the brain of adult and healthy participants. 
I reasoned that the key ingredient of such a map would be to reflecting the patterns of distance 
existing between the locations (the concepts) of the space it represents. Additionally, I asked 
whether I could observe a modulation of BOLD signal as a function of the direction of movement in 
the conceptual space. To test whether any brain region holds these representations, I used a 
combination of univariate (adaptation) and multivariate (RSA) techniques (see Methods). 
 
Behavioural results. During the learning phase outside the scanner, participants were trained for 8 
daily sessions with 8 multisensory objects, performing a delayed match-to-category-name task 
(see Methods). During the last training session, and without being notified, they were also 
presented with 8 novel stimuli that they never saw before.  These consisted in specific 
combinations of size and pitch that were absent in the training set, and they were introduced to 
verify the emergence of a real categorical representation of the semantic space, and not of a mere 
association between names to individual exemplars. The learning trajectory indicated a significant 
increment in performance from session 1 to session 8 (session 1: 60 ± 18%; session 8: 89 ± 8%; 
paired t-test: t24= 8.58, p = 8.86x10-9). Performance collected on session 9 confirmed the 
successful learning and generalization of the categories (performance training set: 87 ± 7%, 
different from chance t= 40.29, p = 1.48 x 10-23; performance generalization set: 73 ± 11%, 
difference from chance, t= 21.49, p = 3.45 x 10-17). 
After learning, participants underwent an fMRI session performing a one-back-category-name task 
(see Methods). Performance in the scanner was high (hit = 84 ± 10%, correct rejection = 97 ± 1%). 
No participant reported, at the end of the experiment, to have explicitly memorized the stimulus 
space in any kind of spatial arrangement. 
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Neuroimaging results 
 
Distance dependent adaptation. First, I investigated whether and where a cognitive map of the 
novel conceptual space was represented in our participants’ brains. I reasoned that a subsequent 
presentation of two stimuli belonging to two difference categories would cause an adaptation of the 
BOLD signal that would be proportional to the distance between the two concepts in the two-
dimensional concept space. Given our stimulus space we had two levels of distance: a small (e.g. 
KER preceded by MOS) or a large (e.g. KER preceded by GAL) one. Regions where the BOLD 
signal is affected by this difference should be detectable using fMRI adaptation, where the 
response to a given stimulus should be lower when the stimulus is preceded by another one with a 
small conceptual distance compared to a large distance. By applying this analysis at whole brain 
level on post-learning fMRI data, I revealed a significant cluster in medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) 
(MNIx,y,z= 3 47 -4; T=6.73; FWE corr.)(Figure 3.2B). No significant cluster was found using pre-
learning data. 
 
Distance-dependent RSA To confirm this result with an independent and complementary measure, 
I extracted from the mPF cluster of the previous analysis the distributed activity patterns for each 
stimulus after running a second GLM (see Methods). Next, I applied model-based RSA 
(Kriegeskorte et al. 2008) by correlating the Fisher transformed neural dissimilarity matrix (DSM, 1-
Pearson’s r) to a model of the predicted distances in the conceptual space (Figure 3.2C). I 
observed that the multivariate activity evoked in the mPFC post-learning significantly correlated 
with the model of predicted distances (t=2.78; p = .005, one tail t-test). Again, this was not the case 
before learning (Figure 3.2D). Additionally, to verify whether this multivariate signal existed also in 
other brain regions, I implemented our model-based RSA within a whole-brain searchlight (radius 
of the sphere = 3 voxels, consistent with Connolly et al. 2012) after excluding brain regions 
responding to differences along either size or pitch between the audiovisual objects (see Methods). 
I found two significant clusters: one in mPFC (MNIx,y,z= 6 50 -10; T=5.71; FWE corr.)(Figure 3.2D) 
and one in the precentral gyrus (MNIx,y,z= 57 5 24; T=6.55; FWE corr.). Given our previous 
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adaptation analysis and the previous studies indicating mPFC as holding a representation of the 
cognitive map of task relevant information beyond spatial navigation (e.g. Constantinescu et al. 
2016, Shuck et al. 2016), I focused on this region for following controls: first of all, the distance 
effect in this area was not present before learning (t=-0.2; p = .58, one tail t-test) and, second, the 
multivariate signal of a spherical ROI constructed around the peak of the searchlight (see 
Methods) was enough to recover a faithful bidimensional representation of our novel conceptual 
space (Figure 3.2E). 
 
Figure 3.2  - Results of the distance analysis. A. Moving in the semantic space implies covering 
different distances. B. Results of a whole brain adaptation reveal a significant cluster in mPFC 
reflecting distances between semantic regions. C-D. This effect is further confirmed using a 
independent multivariate approach (RSA) both within the same ROI and with a whole-brain 
searchlight. E. For illustrative purposes, I show the neural DSM both before and after learning in 
mPFC, which is sufficient to recover a faithful bidimensional representation of the semantic space 
using MATLAB multidimensional scaling. 
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Direction-dependent RSA In a previous study (Constantinescu et al. 2016) it was observed that the 
BOLD signal in the mPFC was modulated following a 6-fold periodicity, typical of grid-cells (Hafting 
et al. 2005; Doeller et al. 2010), when human participants processed morphing bird shapes varying 
continuously in their neck:legs ratio, therefore mimicking a movement in an artificial bidimensional 
“bird space” akin the real-world physical space. Although with our design I could only sample 8 
movement directions, I asked whether I could observe a similar modulation between our four 
discrete concepts, that met both the definitional criteria of human-like, high-level conceptual 
representations: that of being categorical, and that of having a meaning that is conveyed with a 
linguistic symbols, such as a word. I fit a new GLM to extract a beta series for each movement 
direction across the 4 regions of the novel conceptual space (see Methods), resulting in 8 sampled 
directions. By building on findings that an hexadirectional code can be observed in multivariate 
activity patterns under highly controlled circumstances (Bellmund et al. 2016), I combined grid-
analysis with model-based RSA (Kriegeskorte et al. 2008) (see Methods) (Figure 3.3A). By 
computing all the dissimilarity measures between directions, I obtained a model (matrix) of the 
relative distances to the hypothetical hexadirectional grid (see Methods)(Figure 3.3B). Using 
model-based RSA I could test whether or not the neural dissimilarity matrix extracted from mPFC 
fit with the model, by computing Pearson’s r. This was not the case (t=0.41; p = .68). However, 
when I implemented the same analysis in a whole-brain searchlight, I did find a set of brain regions 
where this direction-dependent modulation of multivariate signal was present: right entorhinal 
cortex (MNIx,y,z= 30 5 -32), left orbitofrontal cortex (MNIx,y,z= -15 44 -20), left superior frontal gyrus 
(MNIx,y,z= -30 23 60), precentral gyrus (MNIx,y,z= 60 5 6; all p<.005 uncorr.). Given previous studies 
showing directional modulation of BOLD signal as a function of movement direction in entorhinal 
cortex during both spatial (Doeller et al. 2010) and non-spatial (Constantinescu et al. 2016; 
Bellmund et al. 2016; Nau et al. 2018; Julian et al. 2018) tasks, and given the high proximity of our 
entorhinal peak (MNIx,y,z= 30 5 -32) to the one reported by Doeller et al. (2010) during spatial 
navigation (MNIx,y,z= 30 3 -30), I focused on this region for subsequent analyses. First of all, I 
verified that other biologically implausible periodicities (4-fold, 5-fold, and 7-fold) did not account for 
the signal in this region, and this was not the case (4-fold: t=0.35; p = .94; 5-fold: t=-2.37; p = 0.02; 
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7-fold: t=-2.14; p = .04). Second, I verified that the 6-fold modulation was not present before 
learning (t=-0.55; p = .58). Finally, motivated by theoretical and simulation works showing that grid-
cells activity can be used to estimate distance between spatial locations to subserve navigation 
and path integration (Bush et al. 2015), I applied our model-based RSA for distance effect (see 
above) in the entorhinal cortex. Although I run a whole brain searchlight, I reasoned that, in light of 
the well-known signal drop in the medial temporal lobe (Schimdt et al. 2005; Bellgowan et al. 2006; 
Olman et al. 2009), such a distance effect could have been overlooked by our whole-brain 
correction. Indeed, I did find a weak, although significant, distance effect in this area (t=2.14; p = 
.02, one tail t-test) that was not present before learning (t=0.48; p = 0.62, one tail t-test)(see Figure 
3.3D for the reconstructed bidimensional space using multidimensional scaling). 
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Figure 3.3 - Methods and results of the directional analysis. A-B. Different movement 
directions elicit multivariate activity that can be expressed as more or less similar in a n-fold 
periodic space. By applying the function mod(X,Y,n) where X and Y are the two directions and n 
indicates the periodicity, one can construct a dissimilarity model of the predicted angular distances 
in the n-fold representational space. C. Results of a whole brain searchlight using model-based 
grid-RSA with the 6-fold periodic model. A significant cluster appears in right EHC. D. Distance 
analysis and illustration of the effect in EHC. 
Discussion	
 
In this experiment, I used fMRI to test the two key predictions underlying the “cognitive map” 
theory: i) that a distance-based representational code, known to represent the reciprocal distances 
between spatial locations, also represents the patterns of distances between concepts, and ii) that 
a direction-based representational code, known to be recruited in mammals during spatial 
navigation tasks, is also recruited when humans navigate among these concepts in memory. Using 
a training approach allowed me to master the precise metrics of a conceptual space (made of 4 
orthogonal categories of labelled multisensory objects). This allowed me to investigate the 
modulation of the BOLD signal as a function of movement distance and direction between regions 
of this  conceptual space. Through both a  whole-brain adaptation analysis and a whole-brain RSA 
analysis, I observed a strong and reliable distance code in the medial Prefrontal cortex (mPFC). 
Here, I demonstrated that both the univariate signal and the multivariate activity pattern encoded 
information about the distance between the four concepts of our novel conceptual space. The 
distributed pattern of neuronal activity was indeed sufficient recover a faithful bidimensional 
representation of the conceptual distances. Therefore, my results demonstrate that the activity of 
the mPFC mirrors the patterns of distance between novel concepts, at least during a categorization 
task. Additionally, I observed an intriguing modulation, as a function of movement direction, of the 
activity of the right entorhinal cortex, where grid-like signals have been previously reported in 
humans using both intracranial recordings (Jacobs et al. 2013) and fMRI (Doeller et al. 2010) 
during navigation of virtual reality environments. Consistent with simulation studies indicating that 
grid-cells activity contributes to the estimation of distances between locations in the physical space 
(e.g. Bush et al. 2015), I found a distance effect also in this region. These results might be 
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complementary to the distance code observed in mPFC, although some potential limitations of the 
grid analysis (see below) should be taken into account. 
 
A cognitive map of concepts in mPFC 
 
A previous study by Constantinescu et al. 2016 reported a direction-based modulation of BOLD 
fMRI signal in vmPFC/OFC (and entorhinal cortex, see below) when participants process 
previously unknown visual stimuli depicting bird shapes that varied in their neck:legs ratio. This 
was taken as evidence in favour of an internal “cognitive map” of conceptual knowledge, that 
allows navigation through concepts as they were locations in the physical space. While the notion 
of “concept” in this seminal study was taken to indicate a conjunctive representation of two object 
characteristics, it remained silent on two key features that define conceptual representations in 
humans: the first one is that in our species concepts typically refer to objects/event classes, or 
categories, and the second one is that humans construct, recall, and manipulate these categories 
using linguistic symbols: words. The resulting representations - typically referred to as “semantic 
representations” - can be conceived as regions in a representational space where the different 
dimensions represent different features of the objects that the words refer to, the semantic space 
(Borghesani & Piazza 2017).  
In the current work I implemented a training study aimed precisely at extending these previous 
results and more directly testing whether a distance code underlies one of the most complex of 
human functions, that of organizing concepts and categories using words. Similarly to 
Constantinescu et al. (2016), I worked on a highly controlled 2D stimulus set where objects 
resulted in the orthogonal combination of size and pitch, controlling that variations along these two 
features were perceptually matched across subjects, using a subject-specific scale (see Methods). 
However, contrary to them, I engaged participants in a symbolic categorization task, where they 
had to learn to parse the object space into 4 categories using words, basing on the conjunction of 
their size and their pitch. By associating more object exemplars to a single category name, 
participants were constructing true semantic representations, meeting all the definitional criteria of 
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human-like concepts: that of originating from an arbitrary conjunction of features (similarly to 
Constantinescu et al. (2016), but here extended to the multisensory domain), that of being 
categorical (thus defining more broad regions that support generalization, as I demonstrated on the 
last training day), and that of being labeled with words.  
My study also departs from the work of Constantinescu et al. (2016) on the analytical approach 
used to test for the existence of a cognitive map of concepts. Instead of focusing on directional 
coding, I first applied a series of univariate and multivariate analyses to find what brain regions 
would represent the distances between the novel concepts, as the first key ingredient of any map 
is to reflect the existing distances between locations in space it represents. I did find strong 
evidence of such signal in the medial region of the prefrontal cortex (mPFC), which has been 
previously associated to a great variety of cognitive functions different from spatial cognition, such 
as reversal learning (Jones and Mishkin 1972; Fellows and Farah 2003; Hornak et al. 2004; 
Izquierdo et al. 2004; Walton et al. 2010), emotion control (Bechara et al. 1999, 2000, 2001; 
Rampel-Clower et al. 2007), or assignment of economic value (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006, 
2008). Stalnaker et al. (2015) discussed all these positions and call them into question by showing 
that they actually accounted for very specific experimental situations. They propose a more 
general role of this region, specially in its ventral and orbital portions (vmPFC/OFC), in encoding a 
representation of the “task space”, that is an internal representation of the possible states a 
participant could be while performing a task. Our results are compatible with this view, as they 
indicated that during a categorization task, a representation of the “task space” was encode in 
mPFC: in particular, our task space reflected a categorical and labelled multisensory concept 
space, therefore extending previous findings that limited the evidence of internal cognitive maps to 
the domain of reasoning and decision making (e.g. Schuck et al. 2015; 2016). 
 
The entorhinal cortex: coding direction and distances between concepts? 
 
I also investigated the existence of a directional code underlying the navigation in our novel 
conceptual space. While previous studies relied on quadrature filter procedures (e.g. Doeller et al. 
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2010; Constantinescu et al. 2016; Nau et al. 2018) to estimate the grid angle on a subset of the 
data and further test its consistency on independent partitions, I combined the multivariate 
approach first adopted by Bellmund et al. (2016) together with model-based RSA (Kriegeskorte et 
al. 2008) constructing a potentially more flexible method. The analysis did not show a significant 
modulation in the mPFC region that emerged in the previous, distance-based, analysis, but it 
showed an intriguing result after a whole brain searchlight in the right entorhinal cortex, where grid-
cells in rats have been originally recorded (Hafting et al. 2005) and where Doeller et al. (2010) 
found a grid-like signal when human participants navigated a virtual reality physical environment. 
Although caution should be adopted in making inferences on neural codes following fMRI 
analyses, our study indicates that during multisensory semantic categorization - the act of 
classifying multisensory objects using language, and a hallmark of human high-level cognition - the 
entorhinal cortex might recruit a directional code similar to the grid-like code typically supporting 
spatial navigation, to represent movements between regions of the conceptual space. Crucially, in 
the same area I found a weak, although significant, distance code, which is coherent with the idea 
that grid-cells support path integration and the representation of distances between locations in the 
space (e.g. Howard et al. 2014; Bush et al. 2015). It’s extremely likely that I did not find any signal 
of the distance code in entorhinal cortex during our whole brain analyses (adaptation and 
searchlight RSA) because of the well-known loss of signal in the medial temporal lobe (Schimdt et 
al. 2005; Bellgowan et al. 2006; Olman et al. 2009). It is interesting to notice that I did not observe 
the opposite pattern in the mPFC: although I found a very strong modulation of its signal as a 
function of distance, no evidence of directional coding was found in this region. There are at least 
two possible explanations, which are not mutually exclusive. First of all, although the argument 
introduced above posits that grid-cells might support the representation of distances between 
location in a physical, or conceptual, space, this might not be the only way our brain represent 
distances. Indeed, more recently evolved brain regions such as the mPFC might have developed 
different representational codes to support the same function. Another possibility is that the two 
regions - mPFC and entorhinal cortex - both support the representation of a cognitive map of 
concepts useful to solve the task at hand, but by playing different roles: a possible scenario, in light 
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of the well-known connectivity patterns between the hippocampal formation and the mPFC (see 
Preston & Eichenbaum 2013) is that the former, and in particular the entorhinal cortex, informs the 
latter by using a grid code. In this picture, the distance code reflected in the mPFC would be the 
result of the computations happening at a lower level in the entorhinal cortex. Future studies 
should try to address this issue with more specific experimental designs and measures. 
 
Possible limitations 
 
There is actually a third, and potentially more parsimonious reason why I did not observe a 
directional modulation of the mPFC signal, that could also explain the weaker statistical 
significance of the directional signal in EHC, which refers to a limitation of our experimental design: 
a sub-sampling of the possible directions of movements within our 2D conceptual space. In fact, 
given that I only had 4 categories I could only sample 8 movement directions, that might not offer 
enough information to properly estimate the grid-signal in areas different from the entorhinal 
cortex, at least compared to other experiments (e.g. Constantinescu et al. 2016) where, thanks to 
the availability of a continuous space (which in turn would make less plausible a generalization to 
discrete human-like conceptual representations), many different directions could be tested. 
Moreover, due to the same sub-sampling, I should notify that our 6-fold symmetry model is also 
compatible with the presence of a 2-fold symmetry. While a 6-fold symmetry readily derives from 
the known hexagonal arrangement of the tuning functions of neurons recorded in the entorhinal 
cortex and in an extended memory network in humans (e.g., Hafting et al. 2005; Doeller et al. 
2010; Jacobs et al. 2013; Bellmund et al. 2016; Constantinescu et al. 2016; Nau et al. 2018; Julian 
et al. 2018), a 2-fold rotational symmetry would correspond to a population of neurons tuned only 
to a given direction 𝜑 and to its opposite 𝜑 + 180°. This response has never been reported to date 
neither in neuroimaging or electrophysiological works, and thus seems to me as largely 
implausible. However, while I cannot firmly exclude the presence, in the human brain of a neuronal 
populations characterized by a two-fold symmetrical tuning function, I can certainly claim that its 
presence is, based on our current knowledge, biologically rather implausible. However, even in the 
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case that our results actually reflect a 2-fold symmetry, they would still represent evidence for a 
directional coding that is characterized by either a 2 or a 6 fold periodicity, but not by other 
periodicities (4-, 5-, 7-fold), and that underlies navigating abstract conceptual spaces in the 
entorhinal cortex. Thus, at the very least our results represent novel evidence for the presence of 
both a distance-based and a directional coding (compatible with either a 6-fold or a 2-fold 
symmetry) of concepts and movements among them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To conclude, in humans symbol-dependent categorical format of representations defines 
behaviourally relevant regions of the knowledge space that we typically refer to as “concepts”. As 
human cognition critically depends on language, it is essential to encode the relationships between 
its units (the meaning of the words) to support generalization, abstractions, and inferences, the key 
elements of human flexible behaviour (Behrens et al. 2018). Our results indicate that the medial 
PFC encodes these relationships through distance dependent code, and reveal weaker but 
potentially informative direction and distance dependent modulation of entorhinal signal. On a 
more general perspective these results may be seen as a novel example of “cortical recycling” 
(Dehaene & Cohen 2005): brain regions holding specific coding schemes that evolved, in lower-
level animals, to represent spatial relationships between objects and locations crucial for spatial 
navigation, in humans are reused - or “recycled” - to encode relationships between words and 
concepts in an internal cognitive map (Tolman 1947; O’Keefe & Nadel 1978). 
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OBJECT	NAMING	SUPPORTS	THE	
EMERGENCE	OF	GENERALIZED	SEMANTIC	
CATEGORICAL	SPACES		
Introduction	
 
Humans are able to acquire, store, and recall much information about what they experience 
in everyday life. This knowledge we have about things in the world is stored in our conceptual 
memory, which is organised into behaviourally relevant categories. Categories are equivalence 
classes, based on highly similar patterns of activation for all the items they are composed by, and 
range from perception- based equivalences (a dog and a cat shares the typical shape of all the 
mammals) to more sophisticated behaviourally relevant and abstract similarities (both a pen and a 
computer can be seen as writing devices). Humans construct categories by means of symbols, 
and this gives rise to internal meaningful semantic representations. 
 
But what are the advantages, if any, of having conceptual representations of categories that are 
defined by means of symbols (semantic representations)? Previous studies showed that when 
participants were asked to find items of a given category (e.g. a number), they were more accurate 
and faster in giving the correct responses when a linguistic and redundant label, matching with the 
category of the expected response, was offered as a cue (Lupyan & Spivey 2010; Lupyan & 
Thompson-Schill 2012). Pierce & Lupyan (2015) argued that this might be due to the fact that 
symbols and labels refer to abstract representations that do not covary with specific instances of 
the class or category they refer to, but rather they act as “unmotivated” cues, holding a more 
general, symbolic or abstract representation of the category. On the contrary, other cues such as 
the picture of a dog, or the sound of the animal barking, would necessarily convey information 
about a specific exemplar, as they would refer to the category via an iconic relationship. 
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If symbols affect the access to conceptual knowledge by enhancing its abstract meaning rather 
then the representations of specific and individual exemplars, it is reasonable to assume that the 
same facilitation emerges during the process of acquisition of this knowledge, that is during 
categorization. Indeed Lupyan et al. (2007) showed that human adults were more proficient in 
learning to parse novel visual objects, representing fictitious aliens, into categories, when labels 
representing their category names were provided with them compared to a situation in which no 
label, or a non verbal label, was given. These effects have been to date long established in both 
adults and children (Balaban & Waxman 1997; Fulkerson & Waxman 2007; Ferry et al. 2010), and 
Althaus & Plunkett (2016), following Waxman & Markow (1995) showed that in 12-months-old 
children the facilitation effect provided by linguistic labels triggers an attentional focus on the 
similarities between different objects that share the same name. 
 
Here I report the first results of an ongoing study focused on adult subjects to investigate the 
hypothesis that, besides facilitating categorizing training stimuli, symbols affect the way novel 
object exemplars, for which participants were not trained on, are categorized: in brief, I asked 
whether categorical judgements are more generalisable when the categories are constructed using 
symbols. 
 
I trained 40 adult participants for two days in parsing a multisensory object space into categories. 
One group acquired categories by means of a non-symbolic, where they had to indicate whether 
two objects belonged to the same category or not, while the other by mean of a category naming 
task. Next, I tested both groups on a third day with a non-symbolic task - the same used to train 
the non-symbolic group. Crucially, half of the trials during the test phase consisted of novel objects, 
representing previously unseen combinations of features, but falling within specific portions of the 
the learnt categorical space. By comparing performance during the test day between the two 
groups and between novel vs old category exemplars, I seek to verify whether symbolic 
categorization affects later categorical generalization.  
69 
Methods	
 
Participants. 40 adult volunteers were recruited for the experiment (eleven males; mean age = 
23.6, std = 2.1). All participants gave written informed consent, and were reimbursed for their time. 
They were right-handed with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Conceptual space. You can refer to Chapter 1.3, section Methods-Conceptual space for identical 
procedures. The relevant figures for the current chapter are Figure 4.1A-B-C. 
 
Stimuli presentation. You can refer to Chapter 1.3, section Methods-Stimuli presentation for 
identical procedures. 
  
Experimental design. The experiment consisted of two parts: training and test. At the beginning of 
the training phase, each participant was randomly assigned to either the symbolic (S) or the non-
symbolic group (NS). For both groups, the training phase lasted 2 days, but the tasks they were 
involved in changed on the basis of the group. On the third day of the experiment, participants 
performed a test task that was identical for both the groups. Figure 4.1D 
 
Training phase. The S-group performed a delayed match to category name task for 2 training 
days, where they had to learn the correct category name for each multisensory object. 
Each training session was approximately 10 minutes long, and it was divided into 4 mini-blocks of 
20 trials each, for a total of 80 trials. It started with a brief presentation of the objects as exemplars 
of the four categories (KER, MOS, DUN, GAL). After this familiarization phase, each trial consisted 
of an object presentation (750 ms), followed by a fixation cross (500 ms), and by the presentation 
of one category name. Each object was presented 10 times per training session. Participants were 
instructed to press one key on the keyboard to select the whether the presented name was the one 
indicating the correct category of the object. They were asked to respond as fast as possible, but 
no time limits were imposed. After their response, an immediate feedback appeared on the screen 
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for 1000 ms, indicating with the words “Correct!” or “Wrong!” the accuracy of the choice. After each 
miniblock, participants would be provided with the cumulative percentage accuracy. For half of the 
trials, objects were followed by the correct name, while for the other half they were followed by a 
wrong name: this led to a chance level of 50%.  
The NS-group performed a same or different category task for 2 training days, where they had to 
learn whether two objects belonged or not to the same category, without the help of linguistic 
labels. 
Each training session was approximately 10 minutes long, and it was divided into 4 mini-blocks of 
20 trials each, for a total of 80 trials. It started with a brief presentation of the objects as exemplars 
of the four categories, without specifying their names. After this familiarization phase, each trial 
consisted of an object presentation (750 ms), followed by a fixation cross (500 ms), and by the 
presentation of another object (750 ms). Each object was presented 10 times per training session 
as first stimulus. Participants were instructed to press one key on the keyboard to select the 
whether the presented objects belonged to the same category. They were asked to respond as 
fast as possible, but no time limits were imposed. After their response, an immediate feedback 
appeared on the screen for 1000 ms, indicating with the words “Correct!” or “Wrong!” the accuracy 
of the choice. After each miniblock, participants would be provided with the cumulative percentage 
accuracy. For half of the trials, the two objects belonged to the same category, while for the other 
half they did not: this led to a chance level of 50%. 
For both the training protocols I used a subset of 8 objects (exemplars number 1-4-6-7-10-11-13-
16). The remaining 8 objects (exemplars number 2-3-5-8-9-12-14-15) were used on the test phase 
(see below). 
 
Test phase. During the test phase both groups performed the same non-symbolic same-or-
different-category task that the NS-group was trained on. The procedure was exactly identical to 
the one described above, except for the fact that i) no feedback was given after the response, and 
ii) now all the 16 objects were used. In particular, each trial could be of two types: type 1 (old-old 
trials) presented two objects that were both known to participants, because they were selected 
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from the subset they have been previously trained on; type 2 (old-new) trials presented them with a 
known object, followed by a novel object they never saw before. Novel objects were constructed 
with the complementary audiovisual combinations missing from the training object set. This led to a 
longer session of about 20 minutes. Crucially, participants were not notified about the presence of 
novel objects. 
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Figure 4.1 - Methods. A-B-C. 16 audiovisual objects are divided into 4 categories by means of 
symbols. Symbols are revealed only to half of the participants. D. a subset of 8 objects is used 
during the training, while the remaining 8 objects (generalization set) are used, together with the 
old ones, on the test day. E. Half of the participants are trained with a symbolic task (delayed 
match to category name), while the other half with a non symbolic task (same or different category 
task). On the last experiment day (test day) they are both tested with a non symbolic same or 
different category task, but novel objects are introduced together with the old ones. 
Results	
 
Learning performance during training 
 
Both the S-group and the NS-group had significantly above chance performance during day 1 and 
day 2. The S-group significantly improved its performance in object naming from training day 1 to 
training day 2 compared to the NS-group, as revealed by a significant interaction after a 2x2 
repeated measure ANOVA (F=14.06, p = 0.001) and post-hoc t-tests (see Figure 4.2A). 
 
Generalization during test phase 
 
Crucially, during day 3 (test day)  the S-group was able to correctly categorize objects during old-
old and old-new trials, while the NS-group was significantly worse with old-new trials, where novel 
exemplars were introduced (2x2 repeated measure ANOVA, F=6.006, p = 0.024). Post-hoc t-tests 
reveal that the effect was driven by the fact that NS-group was worse with old-new trials compared 
to old-old trials (t= 2.94, p = .008) and that it was worse with old-new trials compared to the S-
group (t = 2.90, p = .009)(Figure 4.2B). 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Figure 4.2 - Results. A. The symbolic group (S) significantly improves its performance during the 
training, from day 1 to day 2. B. Crucially, the symbolic group during the test day was able to 
correctly categorize both trials with only old objects and trials where novel object combinations 
were presented. The non symbolic (NS) group on the contrary wa significantly worse during trials 
with novel objects. 
 
Discussion	
 
Here, I have reported the preliminary results of a study aimed at investigating the effects of 
symbolic categorization on generalization. So far, I have observed that participants who learned to 
categorize objects by means of linguistic symbols (written words) not only improve their 
performance during training faster than a control group that learned the categories without 
symbols, but they extended categorical judgments in a subsequent non-symbolic categorization 
task also to object exemplars that were new and for that they had not received explicit training. 
This was not the case for the non-symbolic group, who performed, during the final test, significantly 
worse when categorical judgments involved novel objects rather than familiar ones.  
 
These results, although limited as the study is still going on at the moment when I write, are of 
potentially interest for the present dissertation and worth mentioning, because they immediately 
speak on the nature and function of semantic representations that emerge after categorical 
learning. 
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In a previous study, Lupyan et al. 2007 trained adult participants in grouping novel objects 
(fictitious aliens) as members of two behaviourally relevant categories, basing on their visual 
appearance, as exemplars to either approach (first category) or to avoid because dangerous 
(second category). Two groups of people underwent this training performing almost the exact 
same training procedure for which, after each response, a feedback was given. However, a crucial 
manipulation was introduced to make the two protocols different: one of the two groups received, 
together with the feedback, a redundant information on the name of the category that the object 
just presented belongs to. This simple, presumably irrelevant manipulation, had a singular effect 
on categorical learning: the symbolic group became more faster and more accurate in correctly 
categorize objects. These effects were not present in the non-symbolic group, neither in a control 
group that received a non linguistic cue instead of the word label to identify the categories. These 
results were suggestive of two important aspects of creating conceptual (categorical) 
representations using linguistic symbols: first of all, words significantly facilitate the acquisition of 
the conceptual knowledge they represent, and this finding has been replicated many times, also in 
children within the first 10 or 12 months of life (Althaus & Westemann 2015; Althaus & Plunkett 
2016); second, they indicated that there is something special in words and symbolic labels, that 
other cues used with the same purpose do not have. 
With the present study I wanted to investigate what are the key aspects that make symbols so 
useful in constructing conceptual representations, and in general what are the advantages of 
having semantic representations at all. Although preliminary, our results seem to indicate that one 
crucial aspect facilitated by the presence of words is generalization: categorical representations 
constructed using symbols are more generalizable than those constructed without them. 
 
Ongoing and future research will have to address this issue more carefully, also try to link these 
findings to changes in brain activity (see Chapter 2).  
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GENERAL	DISCUSSION		
 
Acquiring knowledge about the world and organizing it into meaningful categories is a 
complex process, one that the human brain solves with a striking ease thanks to the use of 
language and symbols, that define the transition from perceptual to semantic representations, and 
therefore from perceptual to conceptual spaces. The majority of cognitive neuroscience studies on 
semantic memory focus on well-known concepts. Here I had the unique opportunity to observe 
how the plastic nature of the human brain supports one of the key mechanisms of knowledge 
acquisition: learning to recognise individual multisensory objects and to categorize them through 
the association with arbitrary symbols, thus to create novel semantic representations. Learning-
induced changes happened in a set of brain regions, only partially overlapping with the classical 
“semantic network” (Binder et al. 2009), where both sensory and associative areas modified their 
representational geometries to support the emergence of stable representations of individual 
objects and the association of such representations to those of their names. These observations 
revealed that novel semantic representations, where symbols (words) acquired meaning through 
the association to a referent (classes of multisensory objects), originated from the orchestrated and 
integrated activity of distributed perceptual and memory systems, of which the main players are: 
● the Visual Word Form Area (VWFA), an area in the left fusiform gyrus best known for its 
role in word recognition (Dehaene & Cohen 2011), which multivariate activity after learning 
encodes both words and objects in a way that reflect their categorical association 
● the left Angular Gyrus (AG), an area of the left parietal lobule best known for its role in 
multisensory integration and for being one of the key nodes of the semantic network (see 
Binder et al. 2011), where the representations of object identities as unique multisensory 
combinations emerged after learning and where objects and the corresponding categorical 
names became similarly represented, somehow mirroring the pattern observed in the 
VWFA; 
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● the right Hippocampus, a subcortical area in the Medial Temporal Lobe playing a crucial 
role in associative learning (Suzuki 2007), here representing words and their corresponding 
categorical names in a way that fully abstracts from the presentation modality, and which 
activity strongly correlated with behavioural performance in categorization outside the 
scanner; 
● the auditory and visual associative cortices in the Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG) and in 
Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC), respectively, that after training developed high sensory 
specificity, supporting sensory segregation. 
In Chapter 3 I also showed how these semantic representations, being conceivable as regions of a 
novel semantic space, are encoded in the medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC) and, to a weaker 
extent, in the right Entorhinal Cortex (EHC) using the same neural codes typically employed during 
spatial navigation (e.g. Doeller et al. 2010). In particular, I demonstrated,  using two independent 
techniques (fMRI adaptation and Multivoxel pattern analysis), that the mPFC encoded the 
distances between concepts in the novel semantic space, while the right Entorhinal Cortex, 
besides encoding distance, also showed traces of encoding the direction of movements in the 
semantic space, as mimicked by the sequential processing of stimuli. Finally, in Chapter 4 I 
presented the preliminary results of a behavioural investigation aimed at describing the 
advantages of using symbols during categorical learning, with a particular focus on generalization: 
here I demonstrated that categorical judgments can generalize to novel exemplars when 
categories are learned using symbols, compared to when symbols are not used. 
 
Taken together, these results are, in my view, complementary. The role of the hippocampal 
formation in semantic knowledge has been traditionally overlooked in favour of its well-
documented involvement in episodic memory. The results of i) the cross-modal searchlight 
(Chapter 2) and ii) the directional-RSA searchlight (Chapter 3) point to this macro-structure in the 
Medial Temporal Lobe as participating in the process of learning and representing concepts and 
meanings, although the two analyses revealed different sub-portions of this area: the hippocampus 
and entorhinal cortex, respectively. It is interesting to notice, in this respect, that post hoc analyses 
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(that I only report here) indicate that the hippocampus does not show any evidence of directional 
code (RSA grid analysis t = -1.71, p = .10), confirming previous intracranial recordings in rats (e.g. 
Hafting et al. 2005), and that the entorhinal cortex did not showed cross-modal similarity between 
objects and their corresponding names (t = .97, p = .33). This strongly support the existence of 
independent processes going on in these two sub-regions of the hippocampal formation. Among 
them, the right Hippocampus was the one that puzzled me the most, mostly because of its 
lateralization: even lowering the threshold of the statistical tests I did not observed significant 
results in the left hemisphere for the crossmodal searchlight. The right hippocampus is best known 
for its role in spatial memory, which should not have any relevance in my task. However, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, brain regions holding specific coding schemes for supporting spatial 
navigation also recruit them to represent a novel semantic space. Among these, and besides the 
EHC, I found a strongly significant cluster in mPFC, a region that is highly recognized for its pivotal 
role both in spatial and non-spatial tasks and for its strong connections to the hippocampus 
(Preston & Eichenbaum 2013). This raised the fascinating hypothesis that the right hippocampus 
supports the creation of novel semantic representations by recruiting a spatial code. To test this, I 
verified whether the the similarity of the neural representations of the four concepts in participants’ 
hippocampus reflected their mutual distances in the underlying semantic space. To do that, I 
applied the same multivariate approach introduced in Chapter 3, which revealed such a distance-
dependent representation in mPFC. In this post-hoc analysis centered in the hippocampus, I found 
a weak, but significant, result (t = 2.09, p = .023, one-tail). This did not happen in any of the other 
regions emerging from the crossmodal searchlight showed in Chapter 2. This additional analysis is 
informative for at least 3 reasons:  
i) it suggests more strongly that the right hippocampus might use a spatial code to contribute in 
associating words to their meanings, potentially by representing the objects that become the 
referents for the symbols in a spatial format. This would enable answering the question about the 
lateralized effect reported in Chapter 2 (indeed, a very recent work by Theves et al. 2019 found 
that the right, and not the left hippocampus encodes distances between the representations of 
objects arbitrarily assigned to positions of a bidimensional visual space);  
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ii) the results suggests that a similar computational strategy is employed by the mPFC (although it 
did not show evidence for cross-modal similarity (t = 0.20, p = 0.84)), pretty much as it has been 
shown to do for “task-spaces” in decision making experiments (see Wilson et al. 2014; Schuck et 
al. 2016) ;  
iii) that the idea of a “cognitive map” reflecting conceptual or semantic spaces for the ongoing tasks 
via the recruitment of spatial-dependent codes (Bellmund et al. 2018) is potentially true, but at the 
same time it needs a better definition to be able to explain the exact computations underlying the 
role of these different mid-temporal and frontal areas (and potentially parietal, see Doeller et al. 
2010 and Constantinescu et al. 2016).  
An intriguing set of results from Chapters 2 and 4 suggests that one of the directions future studies 
should focus on is the study of the interplay between semantic representations, spatial codes, and 
generalization: in Chapter 2 I showed a behavioural effect of generalization in naming novel 
objects after training participants on a different subset of exemplars, and this effect correlated with 
the crossmodal similarity observed in the right hippocampus. In Chapter 4 I showed preliminary 
behavioural results that a similar effect happens for non linguistic categorical judgments after 
symbolic categorical learning. Is there a relationships between the putative recruitment of a spatial 
code and the advantages in generalization following symbolic categorization? In light of this 
question, which will be objective of future research, a set of results from intracranial recording 
studies conducted by the team of Rodrigo Q. Quiroga, in collaboration with Itzkav Fried become 
relevant. In a sequence of fascinating experiments they reported that individual neurons in the 
hippocampal formation of human adults represent what they called “concepts” (that are, individual 
identities of famous people, places, animals, etc.) in a very selective and highly invariant fashion: a 
neuron responding to the identity of Luke Skywalker would fire only for pictures of that character 
and not to the ones of other ones but, crucially, it would fire also to other stimuli representing its 
very same identity, such as his written or spoken name (Quiroga et al. 2005; 2012). It has been 
claimed that such representations support declarative memory functions specifically in light of their 
invariance to basic metric details of the stimuli, holding a truly abstract or conceptual 
representation of the stimulus processed. If this is the case, than these neurons would serve as the 
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perfect interface for generalization, because they would hold a “core”, abstract representation of a 
concept that does not reduce to the specific physical characteristics of the stimulus just presented, 
and such core representation could be used to evaluate whether a novel stimulus is similar or not 
or, to put it in another way, how much closer it is in the corresponding conceptual space. Recent 
theoretical works elaborated on the interesting similarities between humans’ concepts cells and 
place cells observed in lower level mammals (Horner & Doeller, 2017; Behrens et al. 2018), 
suggesting that both these neural behaviours are signatures of the same underlying (spatial) code.  
 
While the specific other results obtained in my works are discussed in the relative “Discussions” 
sections for each Chapter, there are some questions that remain unaddressed, and will be object 
of future attention and research: 
 
1. Despite strong evidence from clinical and neuroimaging studies (see Lambon-Ralph et al. 
2017 for a review) I did not find any representation of the novel concepts in the Anterior 
Temporal Lobe (ATL). This might be due to the stimuli I used, that varied in size and sound, 
but not in shape. The ventral visual pathway is known to encode shapes of visual objects 
and stimuli, and some neuroimaging works has tried to disentangle whether object 
representations in the ventral visual pathway are defined by the visual properties of the 
pictorial material used (e.g Proklova et al. 2016, but see Proklova et al. 2019). Indeed, a 
simple yet fundamental conceptual distinction such as living vs. non-living concepts can be 
fully accounted for by similarities within the “living” category (e.g. most of the animals have 
similar body structures, with a head, a body, and a number of legs between two and eight) 
and across the “living” vs. “non-living” categories. This is one of the reasons that motivated 
,the few neuroimaging studies that make use symbolic stimuli such, as words, for referring 
to items in the respective categories. A recent study by Borghesani et al. (2016) for 
instance demonstrated that the ATL contains conceptual information sufficient for 
discriminating among different clusters of animals, but it was based on a ROI-based 
approach that ignored regions outside the ventral stream, in particular the AG. In our study 
80 
we found that the left AG represents object categories in a way that is very similar to their 
corresponding names. The AG lies at the perfect intersection between auditory and visual 
pathways, making it the ideal candidate as a convergent zone to merge together audio-
visual information into more abstract representations. Future studies should address 
directly the specific contributions of the left AG, the ATL, the VWFA, and the hippocampal 
formation in representing conceptual knowledge, controlling for the type of task used and 
for the sensory modalities upon which the investigated concepts are best defined by. 
 
2. Classical accounts of memory consolidation indicate that the hippocampus provides a fast-
learning interface for rapid encoding of new memories that are slowly written in the 
neocortex for later recalling (e.g. McClelland et al. 1995). Our results support this view, and 
stress i) on one hand the crucial role of the hippocampus in learning and supporting 
conceptual representations, and ii) on the other hand the role of neocortical regions, such 
as the VWFA and L-AG, in holding these representations beyond learning. It worth 
mentioning, however, a recent paper by Brodt et al. (2018) where the authors, by showing 
learning-induced changes rapidly emerging in human posterior parietal cortex (Precuneus, 
known to be part of the semantic system) and lasting for more than 12 hours, challenged 
traditional models of memory consolidation, reporting evidence of a fast emergence of 
memory traces outside the hippocampal formation. Further studies will have to address the 
temporal dynamics of conceptual learning in the human brain, monitoring the emergence of 
semantic representations during multiple learning stages, and how higher associative 
regions interact with lower sensory cortices during this learning process. 
 
3. The training procedure I designed involved the use of words to tile the perceptual space 
into categories. I chose this approach because humans construct and organize their 
conceptual knowledge of the world using language, giving rise to semantic representations 
where meanings are conveyed by symbols. Lupyan (2007, 2012, 2015) demonstrated that 
language enables subjects to  focus on those sensory characteristics that define objects 
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and object categories, eventually fostering the creation of concepts. This has been 
investigated in carefully controlled uni-sensory domains. Human experience, however, is 
much more articulated and multisensory in nature. What is the role of symbolic 
categorization in multisensory perception? How does it give rise to complex categorical 
spaces, or conceptual/semantic spaces? Future studies should address these questions 
and look for careful descriptions of the effects of symbolic categorization for instance in 
multisensory perceptual judgments, generalization to novel exemplars, and creation of 
categories of abstract concepts of different types than objects, such as episodes or events. 
The investigation described in Chapter 4 is currently going toward this direction. 
 
4. I showed that the mPFC, the entorhinal cortex, and also potentially the hippocampus, 
mostly known for encoding spatial locations using a variety of spatial codes, also encodes 
the geometry novel bi-dimensional semantic space. However, human experience of the 
world is not confined to two dimensions, nor it is possible to reduce all the complexity of our 
semantic knowledge to bi-dimensional feature spaces (or cognitive spaces) relevant for the 
ongoing task. To date, a single study attacked the question of whether  the hippocampal 
formation used the same codes for representing non bi-dimensional environment, but it 
focused on rats, and on 1-dimensional sound spaces (Aronov et al. 2017). Despite 
interesting, as this task was not spatial in nature, much more work is required to investigate 
what these cells are actually involved into. Semantic spaces offer the unique opportunity to 
test not only neural representations that are relevant for humans, but also to test multiple 
dimensions and their representations beyond 2D. If place- and grid-cells are recruited to 
encode both 1- and 2-D non-spatial knowledge, as indicated by Aronov et al. (2017) and 
Constantinescu et al. (2016) respectively, is it possible that they change their firing 
properties to represent any n-dimensional representational space, or they are bound, by 
evolution and/or any biological constraint, to reduce higher dimensional representations to 
the same format of the external physical environment? Future studies shall focus on this 
question by training subjects to parse and label multidimensional stimuli. 
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A wise use of functional neuroimaging methods and carefully designed behavioural paradigms will 
surely help answering these and many other questions. 
Final	remarks	
 
I introduced the present work by asking three fundamental questions in the study of semantic 
representations. I can now provide short answers to these questions: 
 
Question 1. How do semantic representations emerge in the human brain? 
 Semantic representations emerge in the human brain by means of the orchestrated 
plasticity of both memory and perceptual systems. The human brain is likely solving the symbol-
grounding problem by locally modifying the representations of both symbols and their referent(s) 
so that they reflect the association with the complementary stimulus in the object-name association 
(the referent(s) and the symbols, respectively), at least for what I could witness being still at a 
relatively  early stage of learning with my experiment. This process also involves the hippocampus, 
which might play a crucial role beyond episodic memory by recruiting spatial codes to support the 
construction of semantic representations as they were regions of a conceptual space. 
 
Question 2. does the human brain recruit spatial codes for representing semantic spaces? 
 It seems so, even if the exact computations going on in different brain regions where I 
found these signals (right hippocampus, mPFC, EHC) are likely to be diverse and to serve different 
scopes. 
 
Question 3. Does symbolic categorization facilitate generalization? 
 Yes, and this might be one of the key advantages of using symbols. I raised the possibility 
that this function might be linked to the hippocampal formation and related structures (such as 
mPFC) and their recruitment of spatial codes for representing semantic spaces. 
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